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ABSTRACT
AN EXAMINATION OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL EQUALIZATION PROGRAMS
By
Dmitry Shishkin
August 2007

Committee Chair: Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez
Major Department: Economics

While the major goal of intergovernmental equalization transfers is the pursuit of
equity, there is also a number of unintended consequences produced by equalization
programs. In this dissertation we analyze the negative effect of equalization on the size of
factors that are either used to measure the equalized jurisdictions’ fiscal capacity in gapfilling equalization programs or are taxed with the purpose of further redistribution
among jurisdictions in tax base sharing programs.
We propose a theoretical framework in which the comparative statics analysis
shows how equalization programs can induce substitution effect in the representative
individual’s consumption bundle via changes in the perceived price of the good that is
associated with the size of the factor used to measure the equalized jurisdictions’ fiscal
capacity or taxed with the purpose of further redistribution among the jurisdictions. As
the representative individual changes consumption of this good, the size of the factor also
changes, resulting either in a reduction of the budget revenue collections or in the size of
tax bases in the equalized jurisdictions.
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In the empirical part of this dissertation we examine the existence and economic
significance of these effects using two cases of equalization programs. First, we examine
the adverse effect of the equalization programs on revenue collections in Russia’s regions
where regional governments redistributed resources among their constituent
municipalities based on the size of their actual revenue collections. Second, we examine
the adverse effect of the tax base sharing program in the Twin Cities Metropolitan area of
Minnesota on the size of commercial and industrial property where this property is taxed
at a uniform rate and then reassigned to the municipalities in the inverse proportion to the
size of their per capita real property. In both cases our empirical results support the
hypothesis that the equalization programs adversely affect the size of the factors that are
used to measure the equalized jurisdictions’ fiscal capacity or that are taxed with the
purpose of further redistribution among jurisdictions in tax base sharing programs.
.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Intergovernmental equalization transfers are an important part of the fiscal
decentralization system in many countries in the world. They are present both in
federations and unitary states,1 and affect regional as well as local governments. The
major drive behind these programs is the pursuit of equity, which means that the
resources are redistributed from better-off to worse-off jurisdictions to make sure that
they all have comparable fiscal capacities to provide a given level of public service.2
Another justification of equalization is that it can eliminate inefficient migration in
decentralized fiscal systems.
Equalization is known to produce two types of unintended effects: it might affect
the tax rates imposed by equalized jurisdictions, and it might affect their revenue
collection effort or their willingness to attract and maintain the tax bases.
In this dissertation we address the latter set of problems, i.e., disincentives that
negatively affect the size of factors that are used to measure equalized jurisdictions’ fiscal
capacity or are taxed with the purpose of further redistribution among jurisdictions in tax
base sharing programs. We propose a theoretical framework in which the comparative
statics analysis shows how these disincentives take place. We use this framework to show
how gap-filling equalization grants can change the relative prices of the goods that are
associated with the size of factors used to measure jurisdictions’ fiscal capacity as these
1

For example, such federations as Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Russia, and Spain, and
such unitary states as Japan, Scandinavian countries, and Ukraine extensively use equalization programs.
Some supranational organizations like European Union also redistribute resources from its more
economically prosperous to its less developed members.
2
There is a close analogy between these programs and redistribution of income between
individuals.
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prices are perceived by the residents of the jurisdictions, and how these changes in
perceived prices can induce substitution effects in the residents’ consumption bundles.
We also use this framework to show how tax base sharing programs produce similar
substitution effects in the residents’ consumption bundles reducing the size of the factors
that are taxed with the purpose of further redistribution among jurisdictions.
In the empirical part of this dissertation we examine the existence and economic
significance of these effects using two cases of equalization programs: first, the
equalization programs in Russia’s regions where regional governments redistribute
resources among their municipalities based on the size of their actual revenue collections,
and, second, the case of tax base sharing program in the Twin Cities Metropolitan area in
Minnesota where commercial and industrial tax bases are taxed at a uniform rate and
proceeds are redistributed in the inverse proportion to the size of their per capita real
property values.
In both cases our empirical results support the hypothesis that the equalization
programs adversely affect the size of the factors that are used to measure the equalized
jurisdictions’ abilities to raise budget revenues, or which are taxed with the purpose of
further redistribution among jurisdictions in tax base sharing programs.
The study of these disincentives and their economic significance is important
because, as fiscal decentralization initiatives continue to spread across developing and
transitional countries in all regions of the world, there are more and more countries that
are introducing or seek to introduce equalization transfers to address the problems of
horizontal fiscal imbalances generated in their decentralization systems. If equalization
induces economically significant effects in the size of factors used as measures of

2

jurisdictions’ fiscal capacity and/or taxed for the purpose of further redistribution, these
can have negative consequences on the delivery of the publicly provided goods and on
overall revenue mobilization, as well as on local development and overall economic
growth, and can in general create welfare losses. These welfare losses could be measured
and compared to the welfare gains resulting from equalization programs, using a
methodology similar to those in Watson (1986) and Wilson (2003); however, this kind of
analysis is left for future research.
For the purpose of this work we define an equalization scheme as a flow of
money that is provided to jurisdictions in an inverse proportion to some measure of their
ability to raise budget revenues, which may or may not be normalized by their
expenditure needs. In other words, if jurisdictions A and B have identical expenditure
needs, the one with a smaller ability to raise budget revenues would receive a larger
amount of equalization transfers. Also, if jurisdictions A and B have identical abilities to
raise budget revenues, the one with larger expenditure needs would receive a larger
amount of equalization transfers.

3

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Although there is a sizable literature on equalization grants and measurement of
fiscal capacity (Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 2002), there is a much smaller literature on
the disincentive effects of equalization and even fewer papers that have investigated the
central issue of this dissertation: how equalization schemes may affect the variables or
bases used to measure fiscal capacity3 of the equalized jurisdictions.
One of the most known and intuitive effects resulting from equalization is a
negative effect on the revenue collections that takes place when equalization is based on
these as a measure of jurisdictions’ fiscal capacity. Martinez-Vazquez and Boex (2001)
argue that in 1990s the equalization transfers that were provided to Russia’s regions
according to current or base year revenue collections as a measure of fiscal capacity
reduced their incentives to collect revenues. According to Martinez-Vazquez and Boex
(2001), this effect was even stronger at the local level where local governments routinely
saw a large percentage of additional revenues clawed back by regional governments,4
which encouraged them to hide fiscal resources rather than to increase tax collections.
Similarly, Baretti (2002) et al. show that the equalization system in Germany that
distributes transfers among the states based on their actual revenue collections (i.e.,
providing larger transfers to the states that collect smaller amounts of tax revenue) works
as a tax on a state’s tax revenue. They introduce a concept of a marginal tax rate of this
3

Following Martinez and Boex (2002) I define fiscal capacity as the potential revenues that can be
obtained from the tax bases assigned to the subnational government if an average level of effort (by
national standards) is applied to those bases.
4
As we show later in this dissertation, revenue clawback (i.e. the offsetting changes in the size of
equalization transfers in response to the changes in the size of jurisdictions’ own revenues) is an inevitable
result of equalization based on actual revenue collections as a measure of fiscal capacity.
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kind, defining it as the fraction of additional tax revenue in the state taken away from the
region there, and show that higher marginal tax rates encourages German states to reduce
their tax enforcement activity, which leads to lower tax revenues.
Equalization systems that are carefully designed, such as the representative tax
system, can be free from this kind of disincentives as it estimates fiscal capacity of the
equalized jurisdictions to raise budget revenues not according to the amounts of their
actual tax collections, but according to the size of their tax bases multiplied by
appropriate average tax rates (Martinez-Vazquez and Boex 2002). In fact, switching to
another set of parameters raises the question of whether in their own turn these
parameters could be affected by the policies of the governments or by the behavior of the
residents of the equalized jurisdictions.
Addressing this question, Courchene and Beavis (1973) evaluate the “new”
federal-provincial equalization program in Canada5 that distributed transfers based on the
size of provinces’ tax bases and the average tax rates for sixteen provincial revenue
sources.
They show that this kind of equalization system encourages provinces to change
their tax rates up or down depending on the relative size of their per capita tax bases: the
provinces that have larger than average per capita tax base for some revenue source are
encouraged to lower their tax rates imposed on this tax base, and the provinces that have
smaller than average per capita tax base for some revenue source are encouraged to raise
their tax rates imposed on this tax base. By doing so the jurisdictions affect the average

5

This equalization program replaced the one that was in use in Canada in 1962-67.
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tax rates and increase the size of the transfers that they are receiving. This effect is
stronger for those provinces that have a larger share in the national-wide tax base.
Also Courchene and Beavis show that the equalization system would have
punished some Canadian provinces if the size of their tax bases had increased. For
example, according to their estimations if Nova Scotia increased its tax base in 1968-69
by five percent, it would have lost $1,582 million in transfers while only gaining $1,467
in own revenues, suffering not only a decrease in the amount of transfers, but also a
decrease in the total amount of revenues.
Courchene and Beavis offer some options to modify the equalization program to
reduce the opportunity for provinces to affect the amount of transfers that they receive,
but they neither provide a formal model to show how the opportunities could be
transformed into changes in the provinces’ policy decisions nor explain what mechanisms
provinces could use to affect the size of their tax bases.
In a later work, Courchene (1994) argues that equalization might discourage
recipient jurisdictions from developing new revenue sources, as additional revenues are
implicitly taken away through the equalization process. Dahlby and Wilson (1994) take
into account the possible elasticity of tax bases with respect to the changes in the tax rates
as they are concerned with equalization of the social marginal cost of raising revenue
across all revenues (the Ramsey rule for the nation) and show how this goal could be
achieved with optimal equalization grants.
In a very important work for the topic of this dissertation Smart (1998) shows that
under conditions of representative system of taxation the equalized jurisdictions have an
incentive to suppress the size of their tax bases and increase the amount of equalization
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transfers by raising their tax rates. Smart not only points to the opportunity for the
equalized jurisdictions to affect the amount of transfers that they receive when the size of
their tax bases changes, but also refers to a particular mechanism that they could use (i.e.,
imposing higher tax rates) and presents a formal model that shows how these incentives
transfer into changes of the jurisdictions’ behavior.
In a later work, Smart (2002) says that, despite the potential importance of these
incentives, there is little hard evidence that equalization programs have actually
influenced provincial decisions about tax rates and tax bases. Smart refers to an anecdotal
evidence of the protracted negotiations over development of the Voisey’s Bay nickel
deposit as an illustrative example of equalization affecting provincial policy decision.
According to this evidence, the government of Newfoundland and Labrador were not
willing to allow the project to get started as the equalization formula effectively
eliminated the benefit that they would receive from the royalties paid by the project.
The latter example refers to a different mechanism that jurisdictions can use when
facing disincentives produced by equalization programs, i.e., exercising a direct control
over tax bases. Accordingly, in his survey of the role of intergovernmental equalization
transfers, Boadway (2004) considers two sorts of ways that regions can affect the size of
their tax bases: one, by imposing high tax rates that would suppress the size of relatively
elastic tax bases, and, another, by directly controlling their tax bases, like for example in
the resource sector where regions can affect the extent of resource development, the latter
effect, he argues, being even more powerful than the former.
There is a number of articles that study another type of equalization programs–socalled tax base sharing, which is more common in the U.S. at local level (Fischel 1975,
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1976; Reschovsky 1980, 1982; Fox 1982). Tax base sharing differs from the
representative tax system as it does not employ the gap-filling mechanism–rather it pools
the revenues from particular tax bases of the jurisdictions involved into the program and
then redistributes the revenues among them according to some formula, but its major
purpose is the same–to redistribute resources from municipalities with larger tax bases to
municipalities with smaller tax bases. Thus, potentially the program could negatively
affect the size of the tax bases in the equalized jurisdictions.
The largest program of this kind both in terms of geographical area covered and
the amount of tax base that is shared is the fiscal disparities program that shares
commercial-industrial tax base within the Twin Cities metropolitan area of Minnesota,
and not surprisingly it has been scrutinized by researchers.
The first time the effect of tax base sharing on the size of the equalized
jurisdictions’ tax bases was addressed by Fischel (1975, 1976). While analyzing fiscal
and environmental considerations in the location of firms in suburban communities, he
argues that the sharing of commercial and industrial tax bases of each community with
other communities throughout the metropolitan area will result in a situation when
communities are less willing to permit businesses to locate inside their borders, which
eventually reduces metropolitan output, employment and income.
Fischel (1975) presents a model of a market for business location based on the
exchange between residents of communities and firms, and discusses the effect that the
sharing of commercial and industrial tax bases performed by a metropolitan government
would have on this exchange mechanism. Fischel argues that the tax base sharing as well
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as the centralization of local services would result in a reduction of number of firms
located in the localities.
In a later work, Fischel (1976) discusses the economic consequences of the
metropolitan tax base sharing, using the example of the “Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities
Act” that was passed by the Minnesota State Legislature in 1971. This act applies to
communities in seven counties of the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area and provides that
forty percent of the increase in commercial and industrial property over those in 1971
should be withdrawn from the tax base of local municipalities and transferred to a
metropolitan authority that taxes it at a uniform rate and redistributes the revenues among
communities in grants with the amounts inversely related to the per capita market value
of real property in the communities.
To analyze the effect of the tax base sharing plan, Fischel considers a simplified
model of it: a scheme that withdraws taxing authority over all existing and future
commercial and industrial property in the community, taxes the property at a uniform rate
and redistributes the revenues among the communities on an equal dollar per capita basis.
According to Fischel, the market for the business location would not work under
the assumptions of this model because they eliminate the fiscal benefits that represent the
shadow price of the environmental quality of the neighborhood that is reduced by the
presence of the firms. Following the same logic, he says that despite the fact that the
Fiscal Disparities Act leaves some fiscal benefits to residents, it still reduces the price of
environmental quality inducing the residents to increase its consumption. The increased
consumption of the environmental quality would reduce the presence of the firms in the
communities.

9

The major insight of Fischel’s work for this dissertation is that it provides a model
of business location which is the basis for the analysis in the theory section. There, we
elaborate on his argument related to the effect of tax base sharing on the number of firms
located in the equalizing area, providing a more formal explanation, and test empirically
the effect of the tax base sharing on the size of the tax bases in the Twin Cities
Metropolitan area.
There are several other works that study the consequences of the Twin Cities
Fiscal Disparities program. Reschovsky (1980) concludes that tax base sharing is unlikely
to have a significant effect on metropolitan development patterns, which in his
interpretation means that it is unlikely that the plan would stimulate new commercialindustrial growth in the central cities. This dissertation concentrates on a different aspect
of potential changes in metropolitan development patterns resulting from tax base
sharing: we study its effect on the shared tax bases inside the metropolitan area visa-vis
tax bases outside its borders. Our findings are in agreement with Fox (1981) who argues
that income redistribution within the metropolitan area might push citizens and business
firms outside its borders as they would try to avoid the redistribution.
Besides the negative effect on the size of the tax bases resulting from the
equalization transfers formula, there is always a possibility that the taxes needed to raise
resources for redistribution in the form of transfers will suppress the tax bases even
further. For example, in the case of Twin Cities Fiscal disparities program the area wide
taxation of commercial and industrial property tax bases is a part of the tax base sharing
program.

10

Watson (1986) and Wilson (2003) measure welfare losses and compare them with
welfare gains resulting from equalization programs. The results of this dissertation could
be used to enhance this kind of studies, as we put forward a more elaborate research
related to the potential welfare losses from equalization. These authors make a rather
crude assumption about welfare losses resulting from equalization taking into account
only administrative cost and deadweight loss resulting from taxation that is necessary to
finance the equalization programs.
There are two other works that do not directly address the incentive effects of
equalization, but are important for our empirical analysis of equalization on the
incentives of municipalities in Russia’s regions. These are Zhuravskaya (2000) and
Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya (2002) who estimate fiscal incentives faced by
municipalities in Russia, associating these incentives with the offsetting effect of the
changes in regional transfers in response to the changes in the municipalities’ own
revenues (clawback.) These two works are important for my research because they
address the issue of fiscal disincentives in Russia’s regions, which according to our view
are produced by equalization practices of regional governments toward their
municipalities. Both works show that fiscal incentives faced by municipalities in Russia
were rather weak, which we interpret as a sign of extensive equalization practices.
A main problem with these two works is that the term “own revenues” is defined
differently and neither of the authors presents a clear argument why own revenues should
be defined in a particular way. In the empirical section of this dissertation we show the
problems that are associated with either approach and develop an approach of our own
that allows us to measure fiscal incentives consistently when the sharing rates from

11

shared revenue sources assigned to equalized jurisdictions’ budgets are not fixed and
change from year to year. We use this approach further in the dissertation to estimate
fiscal incentives faced by municipalities in Russia’s regions and show how these
incentives affect the tax effort in the regions.

12

CHAPTER 3
THE THEORETICAL MODEL
The objective of the model is to uncover the fundamental conditions under which
gap-filling equalization mechanisms (including “incentive compatible” ones, based on
fiscal capacity as opposed to actual revenue collections) as well as the tax base sharing
schemes may induce unwanted substitution effects on the factors that are used as
measures of equalized jurisdictions’ fiscal capacity or as shared tax bases.
The key point of the theoretical analysis in this section is the notion that most of
the parameters that could be used to estimate a jurisdictions’ ability to raise budget
revenues, including most importantly the size of their tax bases, are not exogenously
determined. Rather, they either represent goods that are consumed by residents directly
(e.g., publicly provided goods or private housing) or are factors that produce externalities
that affect the size of the consumed goods (e.g., businesses with positive or negative
externalities). Similarly, the tax bases that are shared through the tax base sharing
programs are not exogenously determined, but directly or indirectly relate to the goods
consumed by the residents.
If the residents’ choices related to consumption of these goods could be affected
by the elements in an equalization program, then the resulting changes in the residents’
consumption will change the size and composition of those factors.
In this dissertation we consider the following scenarios regarding the possible
choices of factors that could be used as measures of fiscal capacity or as shared tax bases:

13

1. Residential tax base that is directly related to the residents’ consumption of
housing and could be used both as a measure of fiscal capacity or as a shared tax
base.
2. Actual revenue collections that are directly related to the residents’ consumption
of publicly provided goods and could be used as a measure of fiscal capacity in
incentive incompatible equalization programs.
3. Commercial and industrial tax bases that relate to the residents’ consumption of
environmental quality that is affected by positive or negative externalities
produced by the presence of these businesses.
Theoretical analysis of these scenarios is important for our empirical work as we
consider unintended consequences of Russia’s regional equalization programs and of the
Twin Cities Fiscal Disparities program in Minnesota. In Russia’s regions equalization
grants are distributed among municipalities based on the size of their actual revenue
collections, which makes the second scenario relevant to that case. The Twin Cities
Fiscal Disparities program taxes commercial and industrial tax bases in municipalities
and then redistributes the proceeds in the inverse proportion of their per capita residential
and nonresidential property values, which makes the first and third scenarios relevant to
that case.6
By definition, an equalization program redistributes resources from jurisdictions
that are better off to jurisdictions that are worse off according to some parameters. This
redistribution could be done in many different ways, but in this dissertation we limit our

6

In the empirical part of this dissertation when considering the Twin Cities Fiscal disparities
program we focus on its effect on commercial and industrial property, leaving the analysis of its effect on
other types of real property for future research.
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analysis to two stylized equalization mechanisms: 1) a gap-filling program that collects a
head tax from the residents of all jurisdictions and then distributes the proceeds to fill the
gap between the area-wide standard of per capita expenditure needs and per capita fiscal
capacity of each jurisdiction; 2) a tax base sharing program that taxes a particular tax
base at a uniform area-wide tax rate and then distributes the proceeds as a uniform per
capita grant among all jurisdictions in the area.
An equalization program will usually combine the elements of both of these
equalization mechanisms, but treating them separately allows us to highlight the
substitution effects produced by the expenditure components of equalization programs
(i.e., by formulas that assign equalization grants to jurisdictions) and by their revenue
components (i.e., by taxes that contribute to equalization by taking more from
jurisdictions with larger tax bases and less from jurisdictions with smaller tax bases.)
Even though these two types of the equalization programs have been treated
separately in the literature, there is a close resemblance of the equalization effect that
they produce and they could be considered as mirror images of each other: the tax base
sharing program takes more from better off jurisdictions and keeps the distributional part
neutral, while the gap-filling program keeps the revenue side neutral, but gives more to
poorer jurisdictions and less to richer ones when distributing the money. The following
analysis shows that these two programs tend to produce similar substitution effects on the
goods that are related to factors that are used either as measures of fiscal capacity or as
shared tax bases.
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The gap-filling equalization program collects the head tax H from each resident in
all jurisdictions and redistributes the proceeds in the form of a per capita transfer
according to the gap-filling formula:

Tri = b( N − Ci )

(3.1)

where N–the area-wide standard of per capita expenditure needs for equalized budgets,
set by the equalizing government;

Ci –per capita fiscal capacity of jurisdiction i that shows its ability to raise budget
revenues in per capita terms. As explained above, we will consider three scenarios of
measuring fiscal capacity in per capita terms: by residential tax base, by actual revenue
collections, and by commercial and industrial tax base;
b–degree of equalization ( 0 ≤ b ≤ 1 .)
Given N and C i the equalizing government can choose either H or b. If it chooses
H–deciding how much revenues it is willing to collect from the residents of the area to
spend on equalization–then the degree of equalization b is determined according to the
following formula:
n

b=

∑ ( pop ) ⋅ H
i

i

n

∑ pop ( N − C )
i

,

i

i

where popi –population of jurisdiction i;
n–is a number of jurisdictions in the equalized area;
n

∑ pop –population of the area included in the equalization program.
i

i
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(3.2)

If the government sets the head tax H high enough, it could achieve a complete
equalization by filling the gap between the area-wide standard of per capita expenditure
needs N and per capita fiscal capacity Ci for each jurisdiction.
The equalizing government might choose the degree of equalization b instead, and
then determine the size of the head tax that is necessary to provide a desired degree of
equalization:
n

H=

b∑ popi ( N − Ci )
i

n

∑ pop

i

i

(3.3)
The tax base sharing equalization program taxes the bases in each jurisdiction in
the area at a uniform tax rate t and then redistributes the proceeds as a per capita grant h
among residents of the area. In per capita terms the amount contributed by jurisdiction i
to the program is:

Ti = tBi

(3.4)

where Bi–per capita tax base,
t–the area-wide tax rate imposed on the tax base according to the program.
The size of per capita grant h is determined by the amount of the tax collections
divided by the size of total population in the area:
n

h=

∑ pop tB
i

i

(3.5)

i

n

∑ pop
i =1

i
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In per capita terms each jurisdiction contributes the amount of Ti = tBi in taxes and
receives the amount of h in grants.
In this case the equalizing government can either choose the tax rate t and then the
size of per capita transfer h will be determined according to the formula above, or choose
the size of per capita transfer h and then determine the required tax rate t:
n

t=

h∑ popi
i =1
n

(3.6)

∑B
i =1

i

We show how these two equalization programs change budget constraint faced by
the representative individual in the equalized jurisdiction and produce the substitution
effects that tend to encourage the representative individual to reduce her consumption of
the goods that are related to the factors that are used as either as the measure of fiscal
capacity in the gap-filling equalization program or as a shared tax base in the tax base
sharing program.
There are four major simplifying assumptions used in the theoretical model:
1. The model is static, which means that all adjustments take place immediately
(or in other words, we allow in the analysis for an extended period of time so that all
processes have enough time to come to equilibrium.)
2. We assume that the population of the jurisdictions is homogeneous, which
allows us to consider the representative individual and analyze her behavior in order to
predict how the whole jurisdiction would react.
3. The population is not mobile, so we should not worry about residents of the
jurisdictions moving from one jurisdiction to another as well as outside of the equalized
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area when an equalization program is introduced. This assumption also allows us to leave
outside of the model the capitalization effect resulting from the changes in the effective
prices of goods that are related to factors used as measures of fiscal capacity or as shared
tax bases.
4. Also for simplicity, the model does not distinguish between private and public
goods because in the totally homogeneous communities taxes work like user fees. In such
a situation the representative individual gets from government what she pays for, and in
this sense the way she chooses the desired amount of public good is similar to the way
she chooses the desired amount of private good.
Using the Residential Tax Base as a Measure of Fiscal Capacity in the Gap-Filling
Equalization Program or as a Shared Tax Base in the Tax Base Sharing Program

First, we consider a scenario in which the residential tax base is used as a measure
of fiscal capacity in the gap-filling equalization program or as a shared tax base in the tax
base sharing program.
As explained above, we assume that the population of each jurisdiction is
homogeneous and all residents of the jurisdiction follow the representative individual in
her choices. Suppose that the representative individual consumes housing X and all other
goods (money) Y. Given that she has income I, her choice of the amount of housing and
all other goods will be determined as a solution of the following utility maximization
problem:

Max U ( X , Y )
s.t. p x X + Y = I
The solution of this problem is determined by the standard first order conditions.
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(3.7)

Using the Residential Tax Base as a Measure of Fiscal Capacity in the Gap-Filling
Equalization Program
Now, suppose that the gap-filling equalization formula described above is
introduced. In formula (3.1) that determines the size of the equalization grant, fiscal
capacity C is measured by the residential property values multiplied by the standard tax
rate:

C = tpx X

(3.8)

Accordingly, the transfer formula takes the following form:

Tr = b( N − tpx X )

(3.9)

The representative individual also has to pay the head tax H. After adding the
amount of per capita transfer determined by formula to the budget constraint, subtracting
the amount of the head tax from it and rearranging the terms, we receive the new budget
constraint that the representative individual is facing after the equalization program is
introduced:

px (1 + bt ) X + Y = I + bN − H .

(3.10)

The first thing to notice here is that the change in the budget constraint resulting
from the introduction of the gap-filling equalization program changes the effective price
of the good consumed by the representative individual: the price of housing as the
representative individual perceives it increases from p x to px (1 + bt ) . Intuitively, the
presense of the gap-filling equalization program increases the opportunity cost of one unit
of housing as in this case the representative individual should take into account not only
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the price she must pay to get one more unit of housing, but also the decrease in the
amount of equalization transfers that goes down as the size of housing goes up.
As housing becomes more expensive, the substitution effect takes place that
moves the representative individual’s consumption away from housing–this is the major
point of our model.
Another effect of the program on the budget constraint is that the representative
individual’s income changes by the amount of bN − H . This change in income also
affects consumption of housing: because housing is a normal good, an increase in income
will increase and a decrease in income will reduce its consumption. The income effect
resulting from redistribution of resources among jurisdictions can either encourage or
discourage residents of the jurisdictions from consumption of housing, reinforcing or
offsetting the substitution effect.
We can specify the conditions under which the ultimate effect will be positive or
negative referring to the compensated law of demand. The compensated law of demand
tells us that if an increase in the price from p x to px (1 + bt ) is compensated by the
amount of btpx X that makes the initial consumption just affordable at a new price, then
the consumption of X should unambiguously decrease. Because housing X is a normal
good, we know that the consumption of X should unambiguously decrease if the
compensation is smaller than btpx X , but if the compensation is larger than btpx X then
we can not say with certainty how the representative individual will change her
consumption of X as the income effect may or may not overpower the price effect.
To find out the effect of the equalization program on consumption of housing X
by the representative individual, we can compare the amount of income that is necessary
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to exactly compensate the representative individual for the change in the price btpx X
with the income effect of the program that the representative individual is facing.
Accordingly, assuming that housing is a normal good, we can claim that if

bN − H ≤ btpx X , then the change in the representative individual’s income is not enough
to compensate her for the price increase, and her consumption of housing X will
unambiguously decrease. If bN − H > btpx X , then we can not say with certainty whether
consumption of X will go up or down because the income effect might overpower the
price effect.
Note that the above conditions define net donors and net recipients of the
program: we can rearrange bN − H ≤ btpx X into b( N − tp x X ) ≤ H , which defines the
effect of the program on the representative individual residing in the net donor
jurisdiction, and bN − H > btpx X into b( N − btpx X ) > H , which defines the effect of the
program on the representative individual residing in the net recipient jurisdiction.
According to the argument presented above, the representative individuals in the net
donor jurisdictions should unambiguously decrease their consumption of housing, and the
representative individuals in the net recipient jurisdictions could either decrease or
increase their consumption of housing depending on whether the income effect of the
program overpowers its price effect.
Using the Residential Tax Base as a Shared Tax Base in a Tax Base Sharing Program
Now, suppose that instead of the gap-filling equalization program a tax base
sharing program is introduced. The tax base sharing program taxes residential property
values in the jurisdiction at an area-wide tax rate t and then redistributes the proceeds of
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taxation among its residents as per capita grant h. It means that in per capita terms each
jurisdiction contributes the amount of tpx X i to the program and receives the amount of h.
The budget constraint that the representative individual is facing now takes the
following form:

p x (1 + t ) X + Y = I + h

(3.11)

Similar to the case of a gap-filling equalization program, the major point here is
that the tax base sharing program increases the effective price of housing as the
representative individual perceives it: the price goes up from p x to px (1 + t ) - this is a
standard result in the analysis of the effect of taxation. Intuitively, the presence of the tax
base sharing program increases the opportunity cost of one unit of housing as the
representative individual should take into account not only the price she must pay to get
one more unit of housing, but also an increase in her tax payments as these go up as the
size of housing goes up.
Accordingly, this increase in price results in a substitution effect that encourages
the representative individual to decrease consumption of housing.
Also, similar to the case of a gap-filling equalization program, there is a change in
the representative individual’s income as she receives the per capita transfer h. We can
show that the ultimate effect of the program on consumption of housing by the residents
depends on whether they live in net donor jurisdictions or in net recipient jurisdictions.
The representative individual residing in a net donor jurisdiction will unambiguously
decrease her consumption of housing X, while the representative individual residing in a
net recipient jurisdiction the effect is uncertain as the income effect could overcome the
income effect.
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Using the Size of Actual Revenue Collections as a Measure of Fiscal Capacity
in the Gap-Filling Equalization Program

To show the effect of equalization on the size of revenue collections when these
are used as a measure of jurisdictions’ fiscal capacity, we just need to notice that budget
revenues are spent for publicly provided goods:

R = pGG

(3.12)

where R–actual revenue collections to the jurisdiction’s budget,
G–the amount of publicly provided goods,

pG –prices of the publicly provided goods.
This equality between the revenue collections and the expenditures holds as long
as there is no substantial borrowing for a long period of time, which is a reasonable
assumption in many cases. Assuming that the prices of publicly provided goods do not
change, there is a direct proportion between the amount of publicly provided goods G,
expenditures for these goods pG G , and, most importantly for our analysis, actual revenue
collections R.
Accordingly, if we can analyze how equalization affects the representative
individual’s consumption of publicly provided goods G, then we can argue that the
changes in the consumption of these goods will transfer proportionally into the changes
in actual revenue collections.
Suppose that the representative individual spends her income I on publicly
provided good G that is priced at pG and all other goods (money) Y. We assume the
benefit taxation scenario, which means that the representative individual is aware of the
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true cost of publicly provided good G and which allows us to leave distortionary taxation
outside of the model.
The jurisdiction’s government follows the representative individual’s decision
about the amount of publicly provided good that she chooses to consume as it collects the
amount of revenue R that is sufficient to finance the provision of the chosen amount of
the good.
Without equalization the representative individual’s consumption is determined as
a solution of the following utility maximization problem:

Max U (G, Y )
s.t. pG G + Y = I

(3.13)

The solution of this problem is determined by the standard first order conditions.
Now, suppose that an equalization program is introduced that includes a per
capita equalization grant distributed according to the gap-filling equalization formula
(3.1) where fiscal capacity is measured by actual revenue collections R:
Tr = b( N − R )

(3.14)

As we substitute pGG for R in the transfer formula, it takes the following form:

Tr = b( N − pG G)

(3.15)

The representative individual also has to pay the head tax H, determined
according to formula (3.3.) Adding these two additional elements to the budget constraint
that the representative individual has been facing before the equalization program was
introduced and rearranging the terms, we receive the following expression for the new
budget constraint:

pG (1 + b)G + Y = I + bN − H
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(3.16)

The change in the budget constraint resulting from the introduction of the gapfilling equalization program is very similar to the scenario where fiscal capacity is
measured with the size of residential property values: in this case we also can see that the
price of the publicly provided good G as it is perceived by the representative individual
increases from pG to pG (1 + b) , resulting in a substitution effect as the representative
individual reduces consumption of the good that became more expensive. Intuitively, the
presense of the gap-filling equalization program increases the opportunity cost of one unit
of publicly provided good because in this case the representative individual should take
into account not only the price she must pay to get one more unit of publicly provided
good, but also the decrease in the amount of equalization transfers that goes down as the
amount of revenue collections that are used to buy more publicly provided good goes up.
Note, that an increase in the price of publicly provided good is larger, larger is the
degree of equalization b, which means that a larger degree of equalization produces a
larger substitution effect.
The income effect of the program is exactly the same as in the case above because
the representative individual’s income also changes by the amount of bN − H . Following
the same steps as above we can show that the income effect either reinforces or offsets
the substitution effect depending on whether the representative individual resides in a net
donor or in a net jurisdiction recipient.
As we pointed out above, because the amount of publicly provided good is
proportional to the amount of actual revenue collections we can extend the results of our
analysis in this case towards the effect of equalization on the amount of actual revenue
collections. Thus, we conclude that using actual revenue collections as a measure of
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fiscal capacity in the gap-filling equalization program results in a substitution effect that
decreases the actual revenue collections, and the income effect can either reinforce or
offset the substitution effect.
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Using the Size of Commercial and Industrial Tax Bases as a Measure of Fiscal
Capacity or as a Shared Tax Base

In this section we consider the effect of equalization on the size of commercial
and industrial tax bases when these are used as a measure of fiscal capacity or as a shared
tax base. Commercial and industrial tax bases can include any tax bases that are related to
economic activities in jurisdictions. For example, in the case of the Twin Cities Fiscal
Disparities Program, which is considered in the empirical part of this dissertation
commercial and industrial property values are used as both a shared tax base and as a
measure of fiscal capacity.
The model that we present here is based on the model of business locations
developed by Fischel (1975), who argues that under certain conditions businesses that
produce negative externalities have to compensate residents of the jurisdictions where
they want to locate for the loss of environmental quality caused by these externalities. In
such a case the market for business location develops where jurisdictions sell their
environmental quality supplying locations for businesses and businesses purchase the
environmental quality as they demand the locations. We extend this model considering a
situation when positive externalities such as commuting and shopping conveniences
produced by businesses exceed negative externalities resulting in a net positive effect.
The key point of our analysis is that in both cases (i.e., whether businesses produce net
positive or net negative externalities) an equalization program changes the effective price
of environmental quality as perceived by the representative individual creating a
substitution effect that tends to decrease the presence of businesses in the jurisdictions.
The income effect resulting from redistribution of resources among jurisdictions can
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either encourage or discourage residents of the jurisdictions from accepting the
businesses inside their borders, reinforcing or offsetting the substitution effect.
The Presence of Businesses Produces Net Negative Externalities
Suppose that the representative individual’s income is I and she consumes
environmental quality E and all other goods (money) Y. Similar to the previous scenarios,
we assume that all residents in the jurisdiction are identical and follow the representative
individual in her choices. The environmental quality is a pure public good, so each
resident consumes the same amount of it.
The amount of environmental quality that the representative individual consumes
is determined by the following formula:

E = E0 + αF

(3.17)

where E0 is the original endowment of environmental quality in the jurisdiction,
and F is some measure of economic activity in the jurisdiction that affects the
amount of environmental quality according to parameter α.
For simplicity, we assume that F is the number of firms located in the jurisdiction
and that it accurately measures the level of economic activity there, in which case
parameter α shows how the number of firms affects the environmental quality in the
jurisdiction. Assuming that businesses produce negative externalities (noise, pollution,
traffic, etc), parameter α is negative and as the representative individual allows more
firms in her jurisdiction the amount of environmental quality that she consumes goes
down from the original level of E0. Of course, to be able to regulate the amount of
environmental quality in their jurisdictions this way residents should have some
instruments to keep the businesses out of their jurisdiction or let them in when they
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choose to do so. We assume that for this purpose they can use zoning control or some
other forms of regulation.
As the presence of firms decreases the amount of environmental quality,
consumed by the residents, the residents will only allow businesses to locate in their
jurisdiction if the businesses compensate them for the loss of environmental quality by
making some form of payment. We assume that the compensation is made by means of
direct cash payments to the local government that divides the total amount equally among
residents–this is what Fischel (1975) calls the direct payment system of compensation.
The residents are assumed to be immobile, while businesses are mobile. Firms can
shop around for business locations and the interaction of supply and demand results in a
competitive equilibrium with the price per unit of the environmental quality pE .
Under these assumptions the representative individual’s choice of the amount of
environmental quality and all other goods will be determined as a solution of the
following utility maximization problem:

Max U ( E , Y )

(3.18)

s.t. pE E + Y = I

The solution of this problem is determined by the standard first order conditions. The
level of consumption of environmental quality determines the number of firms located in
the jurisdiction according to formula (3.17).
Now, suppose that a gap-filling equalization program is introduced. This program
includes per capita equalization grant distributed according to formula (3.1) where fiscal
capacity is measured with the size of commercial and industrial tax bases in the
jurisdiction multiplied by standard tax rate t. In the simplest case of that kind, fiscal
capacity could be measured by the number of firms located in the jurisdiction multiplied
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by the standard tax rate:7
Tr = b( N − tF )

(3.19)

We can rearrange formula (3.17) to express the number of firms as a function of
environmental quality:
F=

E − E0

(3.20)

α

After we substitute this expression in transfer formula (3.19), it takes the
following form:
⎛
E
E0 ⎞
⎜
⎟⎟
Tr = b⎜ N − t + t
α
α
⎝
⎠

(3.21)

Similar to the cases above, we add the transfer and the head tax H to the budget
constraint, rearrange the terms and receive the following expression for the new budget
constraint:

bt ⎞
bt 0
⎛
⎜ pE + ⎟ E + Y = I + bN + E − H
α⎠
α
⎝

(3.22)

As in the scenarious that we consider above (i.e. when fiscal capacities of
jurisdictions are measured by the size of residential tax bases or by the size of revenue
collections), in this case the key point is also that the change in the budget constraint
resulting from the introduction of the gap-filling equalization program changes the
effective price of the good consumed by the representative individual: the price of
environmental quality as the representative individual perceives it changes from pE to

pE +

bt

α

.

7

Of course, in this case t is not a conventional tax rate applied to a tax base, but a dollar amount
charged from each firm.
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Because we assumed that parameter α is negative (i.e., the presence of businesses
reduces the amount of environmental quality in the jurisdiction), the price of
environmental quality goes down. Intuitively, the gap-filling equalization program
decreases the opportunity cost of environmental quality as in this case when the
representative individual increases its consumption, the decrease in the payments
resulting from the decrease in the number of businesses is partly compensated by the
increase in the equalization transfers.
As the price of environmental quality goes down, the representative individual is
encouraged to consume more of it and, accordingly, to allow fewer businesses inside the
borders of the jurisdiction. Thus, also as in the scenarios considered above, the
substitution effect of the equalization program tends to reduce the size of the factor that is
used as a measure of fiscal capacity.
Also as above, the introduction of the equalization program changes the
representative individual’s income, in this case by the amount of bN +

bt

α

E 0 − H . The

income effect either reinforces or offsets the substitution effect depending on whether the
representative individual resides in a net recipient or in a net donor jurisdiction.
Now, suppose that instead of a gap-filling equalization program a tax-base sharing
program is introduced. This program taxes commercial and industrial tax bases according
to formula (3.4) where B is measured by the number of firms F located in the jurisdiction
in per capita terms:

Ti = tFi

(3.23)

The total amount collected in taxes is redistributed as per capita grant h. As we
substitute F using expression (3.20) in the tax formula, it takes the following form:
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T=

t

α

(E − E 0 )

(3.24)
After subtracting the amount of the tax from the budget constraint, adding the
amount of per capita grant h and rearranging the terms, we receive the new budget
constraint faced by the representative individual:

t ⎞
t 0
⎛
⎜ pE + ⎟ E + Y = I + E + h
α⎠
α
⎝

(3.25)

In this case we can see familiar changes in the budget constraint as the price of
environmental quality E as it is perceived by the representative individual decreases by
the amount of

t

α

(assuming that parameter α is negative) and the representative

individual’s income changes by the amount of

t

α

E 0 + h . (Note, that because parameter α

is negative the change in income could be either positive or negative.) Accordingly, the
reduction in the price encourages the representative individual to consume more of
environmental quality, allowing fewer firms to locate in the jurisdiction, while the change
in income might reinforce or offset the substitution effect.
The Presence of Businesses Produces Net Positive Externalities
To analyze the case when businesses produce net positive externalities we just
need to notice that the sign of parameter α will be positive in this case and follow the
same steps as above. As we can see from formula (3.17), when α is positive the amount
of environmental quality increases as the number of businesses F goes up. Because the
presence of businesses produces environmental quality consumed by residents, residents
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are willing to pay businesses to attract them into their jurisdictions, and a market for
business location develops where jurisdictions purchase net positive externalities
produced by businesses.
Because now parameter α is positive, the change in the price of environmental
quality from pE to pE +

bt

α

resulting from the introduction of the program means that

environmental quality becomes more expensive, which results in a substitution effect
reducing its consumption. This result is an inverse of what we have received when
considering the case of net negative externalities produced by the presence of businesses,
but because the relationship between the amount of environmental quality and the
number of firms in this case is proportional, the change in the price for environmental
quality produced by the program results in a decrease of the number of firms located in
the jurisdiction as well. Also as above, the income effect of the program can either
reinforce or offset the substitution effect.
In the case of tax base sharing program the change in the sign of parameter α
produces a similar effect, leaving the major results of our analysis unchanged. As in the
case when the presence of businesses produces negative externalities, an introduction of
the tax base sharing program produces a substitution effect that decreases the number of
firms located in the jurisdiction, while the income effect of the program might either
reinforce or offset the substitution effect.
Table 1 summarizes the scenarios considered in the theoretical section of this
work and demonstrates the substitution and the income effects that gap-filling and tax
base sharing equalization program might produce on the factors that are used as a
measure of fiscal capacity or as a shared tax base.
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Table 1
The Substitution and the Income Effects of Gap-Filling and Tax Base Sharing
Equalization Programs on the Factors that are Used as a Measure Fiscal Capacity or as a
Shared Tax Base

Negative

Income
effect on the
factor for
recipient
jurisdictions
Negative

Income
effect on the
factor for
donor
jurisdictions
Positive

Negative

Negative

Negative

Positive

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative

Negative

Negative

Negative

Positive

Factor

Good

Substitution
effect on the
good

Substitution
effect on the
factor

Residential
tax base
Actual
revenue
collections
C/I tax base
with
negative
externalities
C/I tax base
with
positive
externalities

Housing

Negative

Publicly
provided
good
Environmental
quality
Environmental
quality
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
To test empirically the hypothesis that equalization programs produce
disincentives that negatively affect the size of the factors used to measure fiscal capacity
or taxed with the purpose of further redistribution of resources, we study two cases. The
first is a case study of the effect of equalization practices in Russia’s regions towards
their constituent municipalities. As the regions distribute transfers among municipalities
based on the size of their actual revenue collections, the expected effect of equalization is
a reduction in revenue collections in those regions where the degree of equalization is
higher. The second case investigates the effect on the tax-base of the tax sharing program
in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area, Minnesota. This program taxes commercial and
industrial properties in seven central counties of the metro area at a uniform tax rate and
redistributes the proceeds among municipalities in direct proportion to the size of their
population and in inverse proportion to the size of their per capita real property values.
The expected disincentive effects that we empirically test should negatively affect the
size of commercial and industrial property in the metropolitan area.
The Case of Russia

The equalization programs implemented by the regional governments in the
Russian Federation vis-à-vis their local governments were (and in many cases they
continue to be so) based on the revenues actually collected by the jurisdictions the year
prior to the implementation of the equalization scheme (Martinez-Vazquez and Boex
2001). The theoretical model developed in the previous section shows that the
equalization programs based on actual revenue collections produce a substitution effect
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that decreases consumption of publicly provided goods and, consequently, reduce the size
of budget revenue collections in the equalized jurisdictions. Accordingly, in this section
we test the proposition that regional equalization programs negatively affected the size of
revenue collections in the municipalities and that these effects have been more
pronounced in those regions where the equalization schemes have been more aggressive
(i.e., where the degree of equalization has been higher).
Estimating the Degree of Equalization Faced by Municipalities in Russia’s Regions
The first step in our analysis is to estimate the degree of equalization that
municipalities were facing in different regions as represented by parameter b in equation
(3.14) in the previous section. As explained in the theoretical section, the larger the
degree of equalization b, the larger the change in the price of the publicly provided good
as the representative individual perceives it, and, accordingly, the larger the expected
substitution effect produced by the equalization program that reduces consumption of the
publicly provided good and, consequently, the size of budget revenue collections.
As the mechanisms that guide redistribution of resources among municipalities in
Russia’s regions are very complicated and lack transparency,8 this task could not be done
by direct analysis of those mechanisms to derive the degree of equalization in the regions.
One can not look at the equalizing effect of regional grants in local budgets in per capita
terms either because most regions measure municipalities’ expenditure needs not by the
size of their population, but by the size of their local infrastructure, which most of the

8

See for example Bahl et al. (1999) for a description of mechanisms used to redistribute grants
among municipalities in Leningrad oblast.
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time is distributed quite unevenly among municipalities.9 Instead we use the fact that
parameter b in (3.14) could be interpreted as defining the rate of revenue clawback
resulting form the equalization mechanism in which the size of equalization transfer Tr is
determined by (3.14):
(4.1)

dTr/dR= -b

As this expression shows, for the purpose of our analysis we do not need the
information about the way the per capita expenditure needs N are measured in equation
(3.14). What matters is how the size of regional transfers changes in response to changes
in the size of actual revenue collections to municipalities’ budgets. In reality, the system
of shared taxes with variable sharing rates (which receive the name in Russia of
“regulating rates”) makes measuring the offsetting effect of regional transfers to
municipalities a complicated task. In the following two sections we develop a new
approach to this problem building on previous works by Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya
(2003) and Zhuravskaya (2000).
Measuring Fiscal Incentives Faced by Municipalities in Russia
Revenue clawback occurs when changes in regional transfers partially or fully
offset changes in the municipalities’ own revenues. As explained above, the revenue
clawback is an inevitable result of an equalization program that redistributes funds via
equalization grants based on municipalities’ actual revenue collections. This relationship

9

This practice in some cases could still result in an equalization of locally provided services in per
capita terms, in particular, if we take into account a common practice when schools and hospitals that are
financed by one municipality serve residents of nearby localities, which makes them more of region-wide
service providers rather than local entities.
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allows us to estimate the degree of equalization by measuring the budget revenue
collections clawback faced by the equalized jurisdictions.
Since changes in regional transfers might have not only offsetting, but also
matching effects vis-à-vis municipalities’ own revenues, we will use the more general
term of “fiscal incentives.” When changes in regional transfers offset changes in
municipalities’ own revenues, these fiscal incentives are negative (the clawback case),
and when changes in regional transfers match changes in municipalities own revenues
these fiscal incentives are positive (the matching case).
In the previous literature (Zhuravskaya 2000, Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya 2003),
fiscal incentives are associated with the offsetting effect of changes in regional transfers
in response to the changes in the municipalities’ own revenues. The problem is that in
these two works the term “own revenues” is defined differently and neither of the authors
presents a clear argument why own revenues should be defined in a particular way.
Zhuravskaya (2000) defines own revenues as the revenues from sources assigned to local
budgets by federal laws, while Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya (2003) also include in this
category revenues from shared regional taxes.
A natural question for us to ask is: what approach should we follow? To answer
this question we analyze and compare these two approaches and then develop our own.
There is a difference in the samples of municipalities that the authors analyze,
which might justify the differences in their approaches. Zhuravskaya’s sample includes
large cities from different regions of Russia with developed economies and relatively
large tax bases. These municipalities retained relatively small shares of regional taxes and
faced frequent changes in those shares from year to year.
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In contrast, Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s sample includes poorer municipalities
from one region (Rostovskaya oblast), which retained the entire regional shares of major
shared taxes for the period of time for which the data are available. The difference in
these two approaches could be explained by the stability of sharing rates–as
municipalities in Zhuravskaya’s sample were facing frequent changes in the sharing rates,
it might seem reasonable to consider the receipts from sharing taxes as an actively used
tool of adjusting municipalities’ revenues. In contrast, in Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s
sample the sharing rates are fixed at the maximum level and stay intact for three years,
which makes it reasonable to consider the proceeds from shared taxes as “own revenues.”
Zhuravskaya’s approach reflects more orthodoxy in fiscal decentralization theory
and practice, where revenue sharing is considered generally a transfer. Moreover,
Zhuravskaya’s approach is more sound from the point of view of the stability of sharing
rates as the retention rates of municipalities’ federally assigned own revenues could not
be varied among local budgets according to the federal law.
In contrast, Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s approach is less conventional, and from
the point of view of the stability of sharing rates it is less secure because potentially no
municipality could be absolutely sure that the region would not change its sharing rates at
some point. Another problem with their approach is that they could only apply it to 46
out of 55 municipalities in Rostovskaya oblast because only those 46 municipalities were
facing stable sharing rates during the period of observation.
Why bother at all by including shared revenue sources in the category of own
revenues and making some assumptions about stability of sharing rates? Why limit the
sample of municipalities to make sure that their sharing rates are unlikely to change?
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There should be some serious advantage of including sharing revenues in the category of
own revenues when the sharing rates are stable, or, equivalently, some serious
disadvantage of including them in the category of transfers.
Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya do not elaborate on these questions–they just argue
that because for those municipalities that were facing stable sharing rates only regional
grants were used to offset changes in revenue collections it makes it relatively easy to
separate own revenues from transfers by putting the proceeds from shared revenue
sources in the category of own revenues.
We provide further support to the intuition behind Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s
approach by arguing that when a substantial portion of shared taxes is assigned to a local
budget and the sharing rates do not change over a significant period of time, the revenues
from these sources can be interpreted to become similar to the revenues from the
federally assigned sources. Local governments can not change the tax rates for shared
revenue sources, but they might be able to affect the size of the tax bases that most of the
time are closely correlated with the tax bases for federally assigned own revenue sources,
also local governments can influence tax administrators. From this angle when the
sharing rates are stable it makes sense to put revenues from the shared sources in the
same category as federally assigned own revenues.
Even though formally the revenues from the shared taxes in this case remain to be
transfers, we should recognize the fact that these transfers are assigned to local budgets in
a specific way–in direct proportion to the size of their tax bases. Conceptually, these are
much closer to the federally assigned own revenues than to the regional grants (or direct
subsidies as Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya call them), and should be treated as the revenues
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that are subject to offset, not as the revenues that are used as the instrument of offset by
regions.
This argument also provides us with an answer to another question–what is the
disadvantage of including the proceeds from shared sources in the same category as
grants when sharing rates are stable? Because we know that as long as the sharing rates
stay unchanged only grants are used to offset changes in municipalities’ revenues, putting
proceeds from shared sources and grants in the same category will obscure our purpose–
figuring out to what extend regions offset the changes in municipality’s revenues. Thus,
for municipalities that are facing stable sharing rates Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s
approach is more suitable than Zhuravskaya’s method.
However, despite its advantage in terms of treating proceeds from shared sources
when sharing rates are stable, Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s approach has some serious
problems as well.
Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s reliance on the stability of sharing rates raises a
number of questions. First, to what extent should a municipality be sure that, on the
margin, the changes in collections of these taxes would not lead to changes in the sharing
rates to justify the treatment of municipalities’ shared revenues as their own revenues?
Put differently, how large should the “cushion” of grants be to make sure that there is
enough of them to be taken away by the region in response to an increase in the
municipality’s collections before the cuts in the sharing rates become likely?
There is little doubt that the municipalities that retained the entire regional shares
of major shared taxes for a number of years and for which grants accounted for well over
the half of their total revenues from Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s sample can be quite
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sure that they could go a long way in raising their collections before the region will
consider cutting the sharing rates. But what if the share of grants in the municipality’s
total revenues is not over 50%, as in Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’ sample, but is about
20% or 10%? Would local government feel secure about their sharing rates being stable
at 20% and not secure at 10%? And if so, where is the line that separates the secure zone
of the share of grants in municipalities’ total revenues from non-secure one? The fact is
that conceptually it is impossible to draw such a line here, and potentially no municipality
could be absolutely sure that the regional government will not cut its sharing rates if the
municipality’s collections rise high enough.10
How should we treat the proceeds from the shared taxes for those municipalities
that are facing changes in sharing rates? Should we immediately switch to Zhuravskaya’s
approach, i.e., excluding all proceeds from shared revenue sources from the category of
own revenues when we observe that a municipality experienced a change in its sharing
rates however small that change was? What if a municipality retained the entire share of
shared taxes for a number of years and then just in one year the region took away say 5%
of the revenues from the shared sources–should we treat the entire proceeds from the
shared revenue sources as transfers for all period of observation in this case?
The following example shows that when municipalities retain a large portion of
revenues from shared revenue sources this kind of triggering approach might be a source

10

In fact, even having a substantial share of grants in a municipality’s revenues does not guarantee
that the sharing rates will not be cut, as some regions (e.g., Tyumenskaya oblast in late 1990s-early 2000s)
preferred to provide its municipalities with grants even though it was possible to increase their sharing rates
instead. Regional administration explained this policy by the fact that the municipalities’ collections from
the tax bases were very unstable and unpredictable, and the regional grants secured more stability in local
budget revenues.
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of inconsistency as in this case there would be apparent lack of continuity in treating
municipalities with slightly different revenue structure.
Consider for example Figure 4.1, which shows the composition of per capita
revenues for two municipalities. Both municipalities are very similar in terms of per
capita revenues, but municipality A is a little bit poorer while municipality B is a little bit
richer: when both municipalities retain the entire share of shared taxes municipality A
collects 60 thousand rubles and municipality B collects 64 thousand rubles in revenues
per capita. Suppose that the regional government sets the revenue target at 62 thousand
rubles per capita, and, accordingly provides municipality A with 2 thousand rubles per
capita in transfers, and cuts the sharing rates for municipality B in such a way that both
municipalities exactly meet the revenue target of 62 thousand rubles per capita.
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Figure 4.1: An Illustration of Triggering Approach When Separating Own and Shared
Revenues for Two Municipalities with Similar Revenue Structure

Suppose than that per capita revenues of municipality A fluctuate just a little bit
below the revenue target, so it keeps receiving regional transfers to close the gap, while
per capita revenue of municipality B (if it retained the entire share of the shared taxes)
fluctuate a little bit above the revenue target, so it keeps maintaining smaller than a 100%
share in shared taxes. In such a case we will observe that municipality A is facing “stable
sharing rates” while municipality B is not, and we will have to treat the shared revenues
received by municipality A as its own revenues, and the shared revenues received by
municipality B as regional transfers. Switching such a big chunk of revenues from one
category to another based on such a small difference in sharing rates demonstrates the
lack of continuity that presents a serious problem.
This analysis shows that not only the application of Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s
is limited to analysis of fiscal incentives faced by poor municipalities, but it is also quite
problematic to combine Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s approach with Zhuravskaya’s
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method to have a universal method of measuring fiscal incentives for all municipalities in
Russia without exceptions.
Thus, given the two approaches used in the existing literature to measure fiscal
incentives faced by municipalities that receive revenues from shared sources, we have
two options: first, is to limit our analysis to municipalities that satisfy Alexeev and
Kurlyandskaya’s criteria of stable sharing rates, and, second, is to use Zhuravskaya’s
approach applying it universally to all municipalities for which the data are available.
As explained above, Zhuravskaya’s approach is not suitable to analyze fiscal
incentives of municipalities that were facing stable sharing rates for a long period of time.
Limiting our sample of municipalities to those that satisfy Alexeev and
Kurlyandskaya’s criteria of stable sharing rates means considering only poor
municipalities that not only had the entire sharing rates of regional shared taxes assigned
to their budgets for a long period of time, but also had a substantial share of grants in
their revenues to make sure that they would not face changes in sharing rates in case
their revenues increase. Even though the number of such municipalities in Russia is
substantial, especially in the poorer regions (e.g., in1996-98 in Rostov oblast, considered
by Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya, more than 80% of municipalities satisfied these criteria),
their tax bases comprise rather small portion of the regions’ total as most of them are
represented by rural rayons whose agricultural economies do not generate enough
revenues to cover local governments’ expenditure needs.
By any means, applying a method that limits our analysis to a particular sample of
municipalities is not a desirable thing to do. Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya admit that their

48

results can not be meaningfully compared with Zhuravskaya’s results because the
characteristics of municipalities included in their analysis are very different.
As we are facing two possible approaches to measure fiscal incentives faced by
municipalities, neither of which is free from problems, we develop our own, more general
approach. This approach incorporates Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s as their approach is
a special case of our method, while Zhuravskaya’s approach could be considered as an
approximation of our method when municipalities’ sharing rates are actively used by the
regional government to offset changes in local revenues.
The core of our approach is the notion that the changes in proceeds from shared
revenue sources could be separated into two components: one component resulting from
changes in the size of tax bases and fiscal discipline in the municipality, and another
component resulting from the changes in sharing rates. We attribute the first component
to the same category as changes in municipalities’ federally assigned own revenues,
considering it as the subject of offset by regional government, and attribute the second
component to the same category as the changes in regional grants received by
municipalities, considering it as the instrument of offset used by regional government.
For example, if the sharing rate for some revenue source had been reduced from
the previous year, the revenues from this source would go down, other things being
equal, but we do not want to count this decrease as the one that the regional government
might offset with changes in grants because that decrease was the result of its own
decision. Quite to the contrary, we want to put the changes in shared revenues resulted
from the changes in sharing rates together with the changes in monetary transfers and
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separate them from the changes in shared revenues that result from the changes in the
size of the tax bases and in fiscal discipline.
More formally, if we define the revenues from shared tax j of municipality i in
year t as

SRijt = Cijt Sijt ,

(4.1)

where C represents the collections of the tax that are split between local and
regional budgets according to sharing rate S (the share received by local budget of
municipality i), then the change in these revenues could be separated in two components:

SRijt − SRijt −1 = Sijt −1 (Cijt − Cijt −1 ) + Cijt ( Sijt − Sijt −1 ) .

(4.3)

or in a shorter notation:

∆SRijt = Sijt −1∆Cijt + Cijt ∆Sijt

(4.4)

The first component, Sijt −1∆Cijt , represents the change in municipalities’ revenues
from shared taxes resulting from the change in the size of collections, given that the
sharing rate is fixed. These changes in the revenues could be affected by local
governments, assuming that they have tools to influence the size of local tax bases and
tax administration effectiveness in their municipalities.
The second component, Cijt ∆S ijt , represents the change in municipalities’ revenues
from the shared tax resulting from the change in the sharing rate, given that the amount of
collections from this revenue source does not change. The sharing rate is changed by the
region and can not be affected by local government, similar to the change in the size of
grant from regional budget.
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We put the changes in the federally assigned revenues together with the first
component and call these the changes in the “assigned revenues”:
The change in the assigned revenues from the previous year is:
∆ARijt = ∆FARit + ∑ S ijt −1∆Cijt ,

(4.5)

j

where ∆FARijt denotes the changes in federally assigned own revenues of the
municipality, and Sijt −1∆Cijt is defined above. The summation over j is made over the five
major taxes that are commonly shared with local budgets in Russia (VAT, personal
income tax, enterprise profit tax, enterprise asset tax, and excises).
We put the changes in regional transfers together with the second component and
call these changes in “transfers”:
The change in the transfers from the previous year is:
∆Trit = ∆M it + ∑ Cijt ∆S ijt

(4.6)

j

where ∆M it denotes the changes in the amount of regional grants (monetary
transfers), and Cijt ∆S ijt is the change in revenues resulting from the change in the sharing
rate for five shared revenue sources.
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Similarities and Differences between Our Approach and the Ones Used by Zhuravskaya
(2000) and by Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya (2003)
We can compare this approach with the ones used by Zhuravskaya (2000) and
Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya (2003)11 by looking at equations (4.5) and (4.6) and the
equations below that describe assigned revenues and transfers according to these
authors12:
In Zhuravskaya, changes in own revenues are:
∆ARit = ∆FARit ,

(4.7)

and changes in transfers are:

∆Trit = ∆SRit + ∆M it = ∑ Sijt −1∆Cijt + ∑ Cijt ∆Sijt + ∆M it .
j

(4.8)

j

In Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya, changes in own revenues (assuming that

∆Sijt = 0 ) are:
∆ARit = ∆FARit + ∆SRit = ∆FARit + ∑ S ijt −1∆Cijt

(4.9)

j

and changes in transfers are:

∆Trit = ∆M it

(4.10)

Here, (in Shishkin) changes in own revenues are:
∆FARit + ∑ S ijt −1∆Cijt

(4.11)

j

and changes in transfers are:
∆M it + ∑ Cijt ∆S ijt

(4.12)

j

Table 2 and Figure 4.2 summarize the difference between these three approaches:

11

In their work Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya (2003) enhance their approach by using planned
figures of municipalities’ revenues, but we represent the one where they use actual numbers as it makes it
more comparable to our approach.
12
The size of municipalities’ population and year dummies are omitted from the equations.
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Table 2
Summary of Three Approaches to Measure Fiscal Incentives Faced by Russia’s
Municipalities

Changes in Assigned

Changes in Transfers, ∆Ti t

Revenues, ∆ARit
Zhuravskaya

∆M it + ∑ S ijt −1∆Cijt + ∑ Cijt ∆S ijt

∆FARit

j

(2000)
Alexeev and

∆FARit + ∑ S ijt −1∆Cijt

∆M it

∆FARit + ∑ S ijt −1∆Cijt

∆M it + ∑ Cijt ∆S ijt

j

j

Kurlyandskaya
(2003)
Shishkin (2007)

j

j

Figure 2: Summary of Three Approaches to Measure Fiscal Incentives Faced
by Russia’s Municipalities
Changes in Transfers
(Shishkin)

Changes in Own Revenues
(Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya/ Shishkin)

∆Rit = ∆FARit + ∑ Sijt −1∆Cijt + ∑ Cijt ∆Sijt + ∆M it
j

Changes in Own Revenues
(Zhuravskaya)

j

Changes in Transfers
(Zhuravskaya)

Changes in Transfers
(Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya)

The first thing we can notice is that when applied to the sample of municipalities
considered by Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya, our approach produces identical results as
their approach. The formulas used to calculate changes in assigned revenues are the same
in both cases, and formulas used to calculated changes in transfers differ by the element
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∑ C ∆S
t
ij

t
ij

, which is equal to zero when sharing rates are stable. Instead of separating this

j

element from total changes in the proceeds from shared taxes as we do in our approach,
Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya just exclude from their sample those municipalities that were
facing changes in sharing rates, basically filtering this element away together with these
municipalities. Thus, our approach is more general and it includes Alexeev and
Kurlyandskaya’s as a particular case.
The comparison also shows that changes in the assigned revenues defined
according to our approach differ from the changes defined by Zhuravskaya by component

∑ S ∆C
t
ij

t
ij

- the changes in collections from shared revenues, given that sharing rates are

j

fixed. Thus, these two formulas will produce identical results when municipality i retains
none of shared taxes or when there is not changes in revenue collections, which makes
this element equal to zero in our formula. Otherwise as long as the changes in the
collections of federally assigned revenues and sharing taxes have the same sign,13 the
changes in the assigned revenues defined according to our method will always exceed the
changes defined according to Zhuravskaya (in absolute values.) The difference would be
the larger the larger is the sharing rate retained by a municipality.
The changes in transfers defined according to our approach differ from the
changes defined by Zhuravskaya by the component

∑S

t −1
ij

∆Cijt as well. Assuming that

j

the regions tend to offset changes in federally assigned revenues and in revenues from
shared taxes with the changes in the sharing rates and in the amount of monetary

13

This should be the case most of the time as both federally assigned revenues and shared taxes
are linked to the same economic base.
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transfers, the total change in transfers according to our approach should also be larger
than the one defined according to Zhuravskaya (in absolute values.)14
The Data Sources Used to Estimate the Fiscal Incentive Coefficients
To calculate the changes in the assigned revenues according to formula (4.5), and
the changes in the transfers according to formula (4.6) that are used to estimate fiscal
incentives that municipalities were facing in different regions, we need the following
data:
1) federally assigned own revenues,
2) collections of shared revenues,
3) sharing rates,
4) monetary transfers from regional budgets to localities.
Federally assigned own revenues and monetary transfers data are available from
the Center for Fiscal Policy’s database, which contains individual municipalities’ budget
data for a number of regions from 1995 to 2001. Sharing rates are retrieved from the
regional budget laws, available on the Internet.15
To adjust the data for different years, we follow Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s
suggestion to adjust the data by the ratio of the region sum of municipal total revenues for
the relevant years instead of using the price index. They argue that using this kind of
adjustment instead of the price index might make more sense because there is a number
of factors besides the change in the general price level in the region that affect regional

14

The fact that both components are larger in my case should not be confusing if we keep in mind
that we are talking about absolute values here. As we expect the offsetting effect from one component on
another, the sum of the changes in nominal values should be the same whether we use Zhuravskaya’s
approach or mine.
15
Accessed 1 June 2007, available from www.budgetrf.ru
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budgets and their ability to provide municipalities with transfers in particular. According
to Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya, in this case revenues of municipality i in year t would be
multiplied by the ratio of the sum of municipal revenues in the region in year t to that of
t-1:
n

γ=

∑R

t −1
i

(4.13)

i

n

∑R

t
i

i

where Rit –total revenues (including assigned revenues and monetary grants from
regional budget) of municipality i at year t,

Rit −1 –total revenues of municipality i at year t-1,
n–the number of municipalities in the region,
Thus, adjusted revenues for municipality i from revenue source j in year t would
be calculated as:
Rˆ ijt = γ ⋅ Rijt

(4.14)

I use a similar technique, but instead of multiplying revenues of municipality i in
year t by the ratio of the sum of municipal revenues in the region in year t to that of t-1 I
multiply it by the ratio of the sum of municipal revenues in the region in year t to that of
year T, where T indicates the first year for which the data are available for this particular
region:
n

δ=

∑R

t
i

(4.15)

i
n

∑R

T
i

i

where RiT –total revenues of municipality i at year T,
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Accordingly, adjusted revenues for municipality i from revenue source j in year t
are calculated as:
Rˆ ijt = δ ⋅ Rijt

(4.16)

It makes the sum of adjusted total revenues of all municipalities in a region in
each year equal to their revenues in the base year. This adjustment eliminates all shifts in
municipalities’ total revenues that could have resulted from different factors that affected
all municipalities as a whole (e.g., reassignment of expenditure responsibilities) and only
leaves year to year variations in municipalities’ revenues relative to each other.
One of the greatest challenges for our empirical analysis is the fact that the data
for revenue collections from the territory of each municipality are not available. Thus, we
need to find some proxy to estimate these collections. For this purpose I use the data on
revenues received by local budgets and their retention rates for shared revenue sources.
For federally assigned own revenue sources the relationship between the amount of
collections and the amount of revenues is straightforward as either all collections or a
certain proportion of the collections from those revenue sources that is uniformly
determined for all municipalities in Russia by federal law are supposed to end up in the
local budgets as their revenues.
For shared revenue sources the relationship between the amount of collections
and the amount of revenues received by local budgets is also straightforward as long as
the local budget retains 100% of the collections.16 When the sharing rate is less than
100%, we should realize that the revenues received by the local budget from this revenue
source represent only a fraction of total collections (i.e., the collections that are split

16

As in Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya’s sample of municipalities.
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between local and regional budgets), and this fraction is determined by the size of the
sharing rate:

Rijt = S ijt Cijt

(4.17)

When we know the share of collections that municipality i was supposed to retain
for revenue source j in year t, S ijt , and the size of revenues from this source, Rijt , we can
estimate the size of collections by rearranging this formula and presenting it in the
following form:

Cijt = Rijt / S ijt ,

(4.18)

The relationship between the size of collections and the sharing rate is inverse because
the smaller municipality’s sharing rate, the larger is the portion of collections retained by
regional budget. Thus, given the amount of revenues received by local budget, the
smaller its sharing rate, the large is the amount of revenues received by the regional
budget from this revenue source from the territory of the municipality, and, accordingly,
the larger the total collections from this revenue source.
Accordingly, the changes in municipalities’ revenues from shared taxes resulting
from the change in the size of collections, given that the sharing rate is fixed, can be
calculated as

⎛ Rijt Rijt −1 ⎞
Sijt −1∆Cijt = Sijt −1 ⎜ t − t −1 ⎟ ,
⎜S
⎟
⎝ ij Sij ⎠

(4.19)

The changes in municipalities’ revenues from the shared tax resulting from the
change in the sharing rate, given that the amount of collections from this revenue source
does not change can be calculated as:
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C ∆S =
t
ij

t
ij

Rijt
Sijt

∆Sijt .

(4.20)

As we can see from formula (4.18), we can not estimate the amount of collections
from a shared revenue source when the sharing rate S ijt is zero: as the local budget
receives nothing of total collections from this revenue source we can not use its revenues
as an indicator of how much revenues from this source have been collected on its
territory. All revenues from this revenue source go into the regional budget, and as we do
not have the information on how much revenues have been collected in the regional
budget from each municipality, we can not estimate the amount of revenue collections in
this case.
For our purposes, it is not a problem when a sharing rate in the previous year S ijt −1
is equal to zero because in this case the left side of equation (4.19) is equal to zero. The
following rearrangement of equation (4.19) clarifies this observation:

Sijt −1∆Cijt = Sijt −1

Rijt
S

t
ij

− Rijt −1

(4.21)

All elements in this formula both in the left side and in the right side are equal to
zero (the amount of revenues Rijt −1 is naturally equal to zero when the sharing rate is set to
zero).
Intuitively, when the sharing rate in the previous year is zero, changes in the
amount of collections do not affect the changes in the amount of municipality’s revenues
given that the sharing rate is unchanged.
When sharing rates both in the current and in the previous year are set to zero, this
is not a problem either because in such a case we know that the municipality received
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none of revenues from this shared source and its revenues were not affected neither by
changes in its collections as calculated by formula (4.19) nor by changes in its sharing
rates as calculated by formula (4.20). In other words, we just set both elements calculated
by formulas (4.19) and (4.20) to zero.
When the sharing rate in the current year, S ijt , is set to zero, and the sharing rate
in the previous year, S ijt −1 is not, we can not receive meaningful results using formulas
(4.20) and (4.21) as Sijt is present in the denominators in both formulas.
There are very few instances of this kind, and in such a case we can assume that
the sharing rate in the previous year was also zero, reducing this case to the previous
one.17
Estimating Municipalities’ Fiscal Incentives
The Center for Fiscal Policy’s budget database provides the data on individual
municipalities’ revenues from 1995 to 2001 for a number of regions with some gaps.
There are also some gaps in the budget laws of the regions (some laws are not available
and some budget laws miss appendixes with sharing rates). The analysis of the data has
shown that the data on municipalities’ revenues for 1995 and 1996 are not reliable, and
because of it I limit the use of the data for years 1997-2001.
The available data allow us to get 123 estimates of municipalities’ fiscal
incentives in 47 regions over a period of 4 years. The general estimation form is given by

∆Trit = a + k ⋅ ∆ARit + b ⋅ Popi + eit ,

17

(4.22)

To treat this case more accurately we can extrapolate the amount of collections in the pervious
year to the current year, assuming that they grew at the same rate as the federally assigned own revenues of
the municipality.
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These estimates are presented in Appendix I.
The major conclusion that we can make looking at this table is that most of the
time (93 out of 123 estimates) municipalities were facing negative fiscal incentives (i.e.,
clawbacks). Another observation is that there is a limited number of regions where
municipalities were facing strictly negative or strictly positive fiscal incentives for all
years for which the data are available: for municipalities in 18 regions the estimates of
fiscal incentives are strictly negative and for municipalities in 2 regions the estimates are
strictly positive. For municipalities in the other 27 regions the estimates of fiscal
incentives are zigzagging from positive to negative and back.
The presence of gaps in the panel does not allow us consistently to compare fiscal
incentives that municipalities were facing in different regions. For example, of those 18
regions where municipalities were facing negative fiscal incentives in each year for
which the data are available, only 7 have four or three years of observations. All others
have two years or even only one year, as for example, Arkhangelskaya oblast. We can
only guess which sign the estimates of fiscal incentives would have in the years for which
the data are not available.
Those regions with strictly negative estimates of fiscal incentives and at least
three years of observations are Buryatia republic, Amurskaya oblast, Rostovskaya oblast
(used by Alexeev and Kurlyandskaya in their analysis), and Sakhalinskaya oblast (four
years of observations), Kurskaya oblast, Leningradskaya oblast, and Sverdlovlskaya
oblast (three years of observations).
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There are two regions that have positive fiscal incentives coefficients for all years
for which the data are available: Krasnoyarskiy krai (2000 and 2001) and Ivanovskaya
oblast (1998 and 1999.)
The range of the fiscal incentive coefficients stays in a reasonable range: for the
time period from 1998 to 2001 it varies from 1.25 for Kurganskaya oblast in 1999 to 1.318 for Tomskaya oblast in 2001.
The Effect of Municipalities’ Fiscal Incentives on Tax Effort in Regions
In the theory section of this work we show that equalization programs based on
actual revenue collections might create a substitution effect that discourage municipalities
from consuming publicly provided goods, and, accordingly, collect smaller amounts of
their own revenues, other things being equal, when the degree of equalization is higher.
But for the amount of actual revenue collections to change when the degree of
equalization increases it is not enough for municipalities to be facing certain
disincentives–they also need to be able to change the amount of revenue collections
according to these disincentives.
Thus, a critical question that we should ask before putting forward a hypothesis
that will be tested empirically is whether Russia’s local governments have any
instruments that allow them to affect the amount of budget revenues collected on the
territories of their jurisdictions if fiscal incentives or disincentives induce them to do so.
We argue that, despite the fact that all taxes in Russia are collected by the federal
Ministry and neither regional nor local governments have any formal power that allows

18

When the estimate of fiscal incentives is less than one, like in this case, it means that for one
ruble increase in revenues, municipalities in this region on average lose more than one ruble in transfers or
in revenues from shared sources.
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them to affect the administrative effort of revenue collections, their informal powers were
quite substantial, especially in those days when tax arrears were rampant and extracting
taxes from corporate taxpayers sometimes became more a political issue rather than an
administrative one.19 In accord with this view, Shleifer and Treisman (2000), Treisman
(2000), and Cai and Treisman (2004) argue that regional administrations shielded firms
in their regions from the federal tax collectors as they could influence local branches of
federal courts and tax collection agencies. This argument could be extended to the local
governments as well.
Even more relevant to our discussion is the argument that has been put forward by
Bahl and Wallich (1995) and Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2006), that out of three tiers of
Russia’ government (federal, regional, and local) territorial subdivisions of the federal
Ministry of Taxation are most strongly influenced by local authorities.
In particular, there are several tools that could be used by local authorities to
manipulate the tax burden carried by businesses inside their borders. The practice when
taxpayers were allowed to defer their tax obligations for a number of years and had been
relieved of any penalties if they promised to start paying current obligations is one
example. In this case municipalities can directly affect the amount of tax revenues
collected in their budgets.
Another possibility for local governments to decrease tax burden on local
businesses is to turn a blind eye on underground economy, and to discourage local tax
police from being too eager when uncovering those businesses that choose to stay in

19

For example, numerous Provisional Emergency Commissions for Enforcing Tax Discipline that
were active in Russia in 1990s invariably included the heads of local administrations of those jurisdictions
where persistent tax avoiders resided.
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shadow. The estimates of the underground economy in Russia in 1990s vary from 20% to
27% of GDP,20 which gives local governments plenty of room for manipulation of the
size of their legal tax revenues as they decide how hard they should squeeze the informal
sector. In this case municipalities can indirectly affect the amount of tax revenues
collected in their budgets as the taxpayers who leave the shadow economy have to pay
taxes to all levels of the government, including local budgets.
The latter instrument might not allow local governments to affect the mix of tax
revenues collected from the taxpayers located in their jurisdictions (e.g., the local shares
of federal taxes could not be paid to local budgets without regional and federal shared
taxes being paid as well), but it might let them affect the flow of tax collections as a
whole, i.e., the proceeds to the consolidated budget of the Russian Federation from the
territory of the municipality. In this case those municipalities that are facing stronger
disincentives resulting from the revenue clawback will be encouraged to reduce
collections to their budgets, and they might be able to do it only by affecting the
collections from all levels of the budgetary systems: local, regional, and federal.
The empirical hypothesis in this case should be that in those municipalities that
are facing stronger revenue clawbacks (i.e., weaker fiscal incentives) resulting from
regional equalization programs, revenue collections to the consolidated budget of the
Russian Federation should be smaller.
An ideal way to test this hypothesis would be to regress the size of the budget
revenues collected into consolidated budget of the Russian Federation in individual
municipalities on fiscal incentives that they were facing and a set of control variables that

20

See for example Schneider and Enste (2000)
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characterize each municipality. The magnitude of the fiscal incentives would not vary
across municipalities inside regions, but only across the regions themselves because of
the assumption that all municipalities in a particular region are facing the same fiscal
incentives being exposed to the same equalization program. However, as neither
statistical data nor the data on tax collections are available at the local level, we need to
rely on the data that are aggregated at the regional level and modify the above hypothesis
to test the following one: the size of tax and non-tax revenues of the regions’
consolidated budgets, all other things being equal, is smaller in those regions where
municipalities are facing lower fiscal incentives (i.e., higher revenue clawbacks). The
idea is that the effect from individual municipalities being less interested in more
effective revenue collections in their borders will sum up and will produce the aggregate
effect on the regional level.
When using this aggregation, we should assume that the willingness of the
regions themselves to collect more or less revenues into their budgets is not correlated
with the degree of equalization in the region. If those regions that pursue stronger
equalization and, accordingly, expose their municipalities to higher revenue clawbacks
are also more protective towards their businesses and are more willing to cover their
shadow economy from federal tax collectors, then the reinforcing bias will be present in
our estimates as the lower level of tax collections resulting from the effect of equalization
on behavior of the municipalities will be reinforced by the regions’ actions. We do not
see why this kind of correlation should take place, and rather would worry about the
opposite effect–that those regions that take more aggressive approach to equalization
could compensate the negative incentives resulting from lower fiscal incentives with
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higher effort to collect revenues into the consolidated budget of the Russian Federation,
making sure that both local and regional budgets receive enough revenues. If this effect is
taking place then our analysis will not show the positive relationship between the level of
fiscal incentives and consolidated revenues of regional budgets.
Another omitted variable in our model is the level of tax relief provided both by
local and by regional governments. As always in the case of omitted variables, it is
important that they are not correlated with the explanatory variable of interest, i.e., that
tax relieves are not correlated with the degree of equalization in the regions.
Having all these considerations in mind, we proceed to the estimation of the
following empirical model:
ln(Effort t,i) = a + b1*FI t,i + b2*OIL t,i + b3*URBAN t,i + b4*POP t.i
+ b5*FC t,i + b6*DEN t,i + b7*TRANS t,i
+ b8*Y1999+ b9*Y2000+ b10*Y2001+ et

(4.23)

where Effort ti–the ratio of tax and non-tax revenues of consolidated regional
budget to the measure of fiscal capacity of the region (see below the explanation how
fiscal capacity is measured).
FI ti–the estimate of fiscal incentives for municipalities k from equation (4.22);
OIL ti–the ratio of monetary value of oil and gas extracted in the region (i.e., the amount
of oil and gas extracted in the region multiplied by current price of oil) to its gross
regional product.
POP–population of the region, in thousands of people.
FC–the size of fiscal capacity of the region as calculated for the purpose of distribution of
federal equalization grants among the regions.
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Fiscal capacity shows how much revenues should be collected in a region given
its structure of gross regional product. The idea is that the value added in different
industries brings different amounts of tax revenues (e.g., in Russia agricultural output is
taxed much lighter than the output of the oil extracting and oil refining industries). Fiscal
capacity is a more accurate estimate of the ability of the regions to collect taxes and using
this parameter instead of simple gross regional product improves the significance of our
estimates.21
URBAN–share of urban population.
DENS–size of population of the region divided by the size of its territory (people per sq.
km).
TRANSF–transfers from the federal to regional budget, including all monetary grants
(resources from the fund of financial support of the regions, earmarked subsidies, etc.)
Indexes t and i indicate year t and region i.
We use ordinary least squares estimation method as well as fixed and random
effect models to estimate parameters in equation (4.23).
Table 3 shows the estimates of the coefficients of the variables in equation (4.23).

21

For a detailed explanation of how fiscal capacity of the regions are calculated see Appendix II.
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Table 3
Estimation Results for Equation (4.23)
Independent variables

OLS

Fixed Effect

Random Effect

Fiscal incentives

0.075*
(0.03)

0.050
(0.026)

0.052*
(0.03)

Oil

0.001
(0.003)

-0.02
(0.01)

-0.005*
(0.003)

Share of Urban Population

-0.01*
(0.002)

-

-0.006*
(0.003)

Population

0.0001*
(0.00002)

0.003
(0.002)

0.0001*
(0.00003)

Fiscal Capacity per capita

0.001
(0.0005)

0.01
(0.01)

0.002*
(0.0005)

Population Density

0.002*
(0.001)

-

0.001
(0.001)

Transfers from federal budget

0.0001*
(0.00003)

0.0001
(0.001)

0.0001*
(0.0001)

Y1999

-0.36*
(0.05)

-0.35*
(0.04)

-0.37*
(0.03)

Y2000

-0.39*
(0.05)

-0.32*
(0.06)

-0.39*
(0.04)

Y2001

-0.59*
(0.06)

-0.52*
(0.09)

-0.61*
(0.05)

Constant

-1.74*
-7.79*
(-11.52)
(3.95)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*The coefficient is different from zero at the 5% significance level.

-1.70*
(0.22)

The results related to the estimates of the coefficients of the control variables on
the tax effort are not easy to interpret, even though most of them are statistically
significant at the 5% level. The negative sign of the estimate for the coefficient that
shows the effect of the oil and gas extraction in the region is rather puzzling. It might
mean that the affluent firms involved into oil and gas business in 1990s and early 2000s
were successful in avoiding tax payments. A lower level of tax effort in the regions with
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a larger share of urban population is also counterintuitive as we would expect the tax
administrators to be more efficient in urban areas. Regions with larger population seem to
produce a larger tax effort as does population density (which is not quite consistent with
the negative effect of share of urban population on tax effort). The size of per capita
fiscal capacity also positively affects the level of tax effort in the regions as well as the
share of transfers from the federal budget in regional budgets.
The estimates for the coefficient of the variable of interest, fiscal incentives, are in
agreement with our hypothesis that in those regions where municipalities are facing
higher fiscal incentives the level of revenue collections is higher as indicated by the
positive sign of the coefficient.
For all but one specification of the model, we can not reject the hypothesis that
the fiscal incentives faced by municipalities in the regions positively affect the size of the
regions’ consolidated revenue collections as share of adjusted fiscal capacity (i.e., tax
effort). The fixed effect specification of the model does not provide an estimate that is
significant at a 5% significance level, but the point estimate is still positive.
The estimates of coefficient b1 in equation (4.23) that measures the effect of fiscal
incentives on the size of revenue collections as share of adjusted gross regional product
(i.e., tax effort) vary from 0.075 in the OLS specification to 0.052 in the random effect
specification.
The magnitude of the estimate is rather small: according to random effect model,
which is favored by the Hausman test, it is equal to 0.052 or 5.2%. Because in our model
we use the logarithm of dependent variable, the coefficient b1 measures the semielasticity of tax effort with respect to fiscal incentives, which means that as fiscal
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incentives change by one unit (e.g., from 0 to 1), the tax effort in a region changes by
5.2%. Note that a one unit change in fiscal incentives is a substantial change because it
could mean a change from complete equalization (fiscal incentives equal to -1, i.e.,
complete revenue clawback) to no equalization at all (fiscal incentives equal to 0, i.e., no
revenue clawback at all).
The positive sign of the coefficient tells us that higher fiscal incentives–larger in
absolute value when positive and smaller in absolute value when negative–result in a
higher revenue collections given the size of the region’s fiscal capacity, which is
consistent with our hypothesis.
There are two important implications of this result. First, it is consistent with our
theoretical model that shows that equalization programs that are based on actual revenue
collections might make consumption of publicly provided goods relatively more
expensive and create a substantial effect that discourages equalized municipalities from
consuming publicly provided goods and, accordingly, reduce local governments’ effort in
enhancing revenue collections in their municipalities. Second, this result is consistent
with our argument that, despite the lack of formal administrative powers toward
territorial subdivisions of the federal Ministry of Taxation, local governments still might
have the necessary tools and effective mechanisms that allow them to influence the size
of revenue collections in their municipalities.
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The Case of the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area Fiscal Disparities Program

The tax base sharing program established in the Twin Cities metropolitan area
taxes a certain portion of commercial and industrial properties and redistributes the
proceeds among municipalities in direct proportion to their population size and in inverse
proportion to their real property (which includes commercial and industrial property as
well as residential property). The theoretical model developed earlier shows that the
equalization programs of this kind produce a substitution effect that decreases presence of
businesses in the equalized area, consequently reducing the size of commercial and
industrial property in the jurisdictions that are subject to equalization. Accordingly, in
this section we test the proposition that the fiscal disparities program negatively affected
the size of commercial and industrial property in the municipalities that are included in
the tax base sharing program.
Description of the Program
The official statutory name of the program is the Charles R. Weaver Metropolitan
Revenue Distribution Act, but it is often referred to by its nickname, the “fiscal
disparities program.” It was enacted in 1971, but court challenges prevented the
program’s implementation until 1975. This program is codified in Minnesota Statutes,
chapter 473F, and it affects all taxing jurisdictions (i.e., counties, cities, towns, schools
districts, and special taxing districts) located in the Twin Cities Metropolitan area.
Originally, the objectives of the program included six components, three of which
emphasized the goals of sharing, help, and establishing incentives for all parts of the area
to work for the growth of the area as a whole. Two others focused on a reduction of fiscal
considerations on the location of businesses and protection of the environment, and one
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objective declared that resources should stay at the local level when redistributed. Later,
these objectives were reconsidered, and currently they include two major goals: 1)
promoting more orderly regional development, and 2) improving equity in the
distribution of fiscal resources.
The program works as if 40 percent of all commercial-industrial (C/I) property
that developed in the jurisdiction since 197122 was removed from local taxing authority
(contributed tax base), accumulated in a pool, and then redistributed among jurisdictions
in direct proportion to the size of their population and in inverse proportion to their per
capita real property (distributed tax base).
Contributions to the Areawide Tax Base
The fiscal disparities law requires that each taxing jurisdiction to contribute 40
percent of the growth in its C/I property tax base since the 1971 assessment to an
areawide pool. C/I property includes all businesses, offices, stores, warehouses, factories,
gas stations, parking ramps, etc. It also includes public utility property and vacant land
that is zoned commercial or industrial, but most personal C/I property is exempt from
taxation under the program. The growth in property includes the total net change in net
tax capacity since 1971, including the effects of new construction, inflation, demolition,
revaluation, appreciation, and depreciation.
A property’s net tax capacity is determined by multiplying the property’s taxable
market value by the relevant class rate or rates. Class rates are set by statute, vary by
property type, and are uniform statewide.

22

Even though the program was implemented in 1975, the 1971 assessment remains the
benchmark year.
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From the net tax capacity of the industrial and commercial parcel j in the area Vj
its net tax capacity in the base year of 1971, V0j, is subtracted.
The leftover, V1j= Vj - V0j is the change in the net tax capacity since 1971 for the
parcel j.
The net tax capacity in the base year of 1971, V0j, and 60% of the change in the
net tax capacity since 1971, V1j, are taxed by the local government at a local rate ti.
40% of the change in the net tax capacity of parcel j since 1971, V1j, is assigned to
the areawide base.
The tax capacity contributed by jurisdiction i to the areawide base is
m

Ci = ∑ 0.4 ⋅V1 j , where m is the number of C/I parcels in the jurisdiction.
j =1

Total size of the areawide tax base in the metro area is determined as the sum of
n

all jurisdictions’ contribution: C = ∑ Ci
i =1

Distribution from Areawide Tax Base
Each locality is assigned a share si in the area wide base C:
si =

where I i = popi

Ii

∑I

,

(4.24)

i

FC
,
FCi

where popi–is the population of the locality i,
FCi–its per capita fiscal capacity,
FC - the average across the area per capita fiscal capacity. Fiscal capacity is the market

value of real and personal property within a locality. It is important to note that the fiscal
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capacity here includes not only the industrial and commercial property but other types of
property as well.
The dollar value of the share in the area wide base C assigned to the jurisdiction i:

Di = si ⋅ C . Thus the revenues that a locality receives after the tax base sharing:
Ri = ti (V0i + 0.6 ⋅V1i + Di ) , where the first two components in parentheses represent the
revenues that come from taxing C/I property in the locality, and the third component
represents the revenues that come from taxing a jurisdiction’s share in the areawide tax
base C.
Impact on Individual Parcels
As each jurisdiction applies to its distribution net tax capacity Di its local tax rate
ti, its levy on it is Li = t i Di .
n

The total areawide levy is L = ∑ Li , and the areawide tax rate is t a / w =
i

L
.
C

Each C/I parcel’s net tax capacity is split into an areawide portion and a local
portion according to the following ratio:
s ia / w =

Ci
Total _ CI _ Tax _ Capacity

,
i

where Ci is the tax capacity contributed by jurisdiction i as defined above, and
Total_CI_Tax_Capacityi is total C/I tax capacity in jurisdiction i.
This ratio determines the portion of each C/I parcel’s net capacity that pays a tax
determined by the areawide tax rate ta/w. The rest of the parcel’s net tax capacity pays a
tax determined by the local tax rate tl.
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Thus,

s a / w is the areawide portion of property tax paid by the C/I parcel, and

(1 − sa / w ) is the local portion of property tax paid by the C/I parcel.
Figure 4.3 illustrates how the tax base sharing mechanism works.
Figure 3: Graphical Illustration of the Fiscal Disparities Program
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ta / w =

L
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Apparently the provision that instead of sharing some specific portion of
commercial and industrial property in the metropolitan area, the difference between the
current tax capacity and the tax capacity in the benchmark year (1971) should be shared
has been implemented in the program to allow it to gain its effect gradually as the tax
bases grow due to inflation, growth in property values, and economic development of the
area. For the purpose of our analysis it would have been more desirable if the program
had taken full effect as soon as it was introduced. We should be careful in interpreting the
results of our empirical analysis because, besides the effect of the tax base sharing
program that has been gradually increasing in its magnitude since 1974, some other
factors could have been introduced that affected the distribution of C/I property inside
and outside of the metropolitan area.
Figure 4 and Table B1 in Appendix III show how metro areawide tax base was
growing in 1975-2004 as a percentage of total metro commercial and industrial tax bases.
In 1975 the share of the area wide pool in total metro commercial-industrial tax
base was only about 7 %, ten years later in 1985 it reached 24 %, by 1995 it was at the
level of 26 %, and currently it exceeds 32 %. Accordingly, it means that currently more
than 80 % of the existing commercial and industrial tax bases in the Twin Cities
Metropolitan area represents the increase in the value since 1971, and is being shared
according to the program. (0.80*0.40=0.32). What is important for the purpose of our
analysis is that for more than ten years about a third of all commercial and industrial
property in the Twin Cities area has been taxed at a uniform areawide tax rate and the
revenues redistributed among jurisdictions in the area. Effectively, it means that in our
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theoretical model the tax rate at which the property is taxed for further redistribution
should be adjusted according to this ratio (i.e., the effective tax rate will be 32% of the
actual areawide tax rate).
A decrease in the share of the area-wide pool in total metro C/I tax bases in mid1990s resulted from a slump in C/I real estate values in that period of time.
Figure 4: Percentage of Total Metro Commercial and Industrial Tax Base Comprised by
the Area-Wide Pool, 1975-2004
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On the expenditure side this program adjusts per capita amount of commercial
and industrial tax bases assigned to a municipality in inverse proportion to the
municipality’s per capita size of real property.23 We rearrange equation (4.24) to show
more explicitly the relationship between the size of per capita commercial and industrial
tax base that is assigned to a municipality and the size of its per capita real property:

23

All real property includes residential homes, town homes, condominiums, apartments,
commercial and industrial property, and vacant land.
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yi =

C
N −1 ⎛ pop ⎞
j
⎟ − popi
FC i ∑ ⎜
⎟
⎜
j ≠ i ⎝ FC j ⎠

(4.25)

where FCi is the municipality’s per capita size of real property (fiscal capacity,)

pop j is jurisdictions’ population size, and
N is the total number of jurisdictions participating in the program.
Formula (4.25) shows that the larger per capita real property in a municipality, the
smaller is the size of commercial and industrial tax base assigned to the municipality
according to the program. It results in a tax base clawback effect as the increase in own
per capita real property brings a decrease in the size of per capita assigned commercial
and industrial tax bases. Similar to the gap-filling equalization scheme described in the
theoretical section, this kind of equalization formula would also result in a substitution
effect encouraging municipalities to reduce the presence of commercial and industrial
firms inside their borders.
The clawback effect on the municipalities’ per capita real property resulting from
the distributional formula could be estimated by differentiating the formula with respect
to the size of fiscal capacity of the municipalities:

dyi
C
=−
2
dFC i
N −1 pop
⎡
⎤
j
+ popi ⎥
⎢ FC i ∑
j ≠ i FC j
⎢⎣
⎥⎦

N −1

pop j

j ≠i

j

∑ FC

(4.26)

The negative sign of equation (4.26) shows that the size of per capita commercial
and industrial tax base assigned to a municipality and its fiscal capacity move in the
opposite directions, i.e., as per capita real property in a municipality increases, the size of
per capita commercial and industrial property redistributed to this municipality goes
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down and vise versa. Moreover, this inverse relationship is larger for municipalities with
lower per capita real property: as fiscal capacity goes down, the magnitude of the
clawback goes up in the quadratic proportion.
For municipalities with a very low level of fiscal capacity, increasing its size
could be even self-defeating if the magnitude of clawback is larger than unity, which
means that the gain in their own fiscal capacity will result in a larger decrease in the
shared tax base that is assigned according to the program. In other words, for
municipalities with very small fiscal capacity a decrease in per capita redistributed
commercial and industrial property overcompensates for the increase in per capita real
property when the latter goes up.
The condition for this situation is presented by the following expression:
N −1

C∑
FCi <

pop j

− popi
FC j
N −1 pop
j

j ≠i

∑ FC
j ≠i

(4.27)

j

In such a case, unless some other considerations induce them to do otherwise,
municipalities with low per capita real property will be discouraged from allowing their
per capita real property to grow (e.g., by tightening their zoning laws). Moreover, they
might be even encouraged to suppress their per capita real property (e.g., by tightening
loval regulations and by increasing local tax burden on businesses located inside their
borders) because, if the magnitude of the clawback is larger than unity, a decrease in their
own per capita real property will be more than compensated by the increase in per capita
commercial and industrial property that is shared with them.
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We estimate the magnitude of this disincentive effect using data for year 2003 for
a sample of 138 cities in the Twin Cities Metropolitan. The disincentives measured by
absolute value of (4.26) vary from 0.005 for the richest city in terms of per capita
property tax base (Woodland, $3,360 in total tax capacity per capita) to 3.323 for the
poorest city in terms of per capita property tax base (Landfall, $144 in total tax capacity
per capita). The latter is the only city that according to the simulation has the magnitude
of disincentive larger than 1. Figure 5 shows the level of disincentives that the cities were
facing according to the simulation:
Figure 5: Disincentives Faced by Cities in Seven-County Twin Cities Metropolitan Area
(Simulation), 2003
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Table 4 shows the real property tax base disincentives are distributed among cities
of Seven-County Twin Cities metropolitan area.
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Table 4
Frequency and Cumulative Percentage of the Real Property Tax Base Disincentives for
Cities in the Seven-County Twin Cites Metropolitan Area
Bin

Frequency Cumulative %

0.1

58

42.03%

0.2

53

80.43%

0.3

18

93.48%

0.4

6

97.83%

0.5

0

97.83%

0.6

1

98.55%

0.7

0

98.55%

0.8

0

98.55%

0.9

1

99.28%

1

0

99.28%

More

1

100.00%

According to Table 3, 58 cities (42% of total number) were facing real property
tax base disincentives that were smaller than 0.1. For 53 cities, the disincentive was in the
range between 0.1 and 0.20, for 18 cities–between 0.2 and 0.3, for 6 cities–between 0.3
and 0.4, and for 3 cities the disincentives were larger than 0.5: 0.563 for New Trier, 0.856
for Hilltop, and 3.323 for Landfall. Thus, more than a half of the cities were facing real
tax base disincentives larger than 0.1.
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Figure 6: Fiscal Capacity and per capita Commercial and Industrial Shared Tax Bases,
Simulation, Dollars
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Figure 6 shows that one municipality, the one with the lowest per capita real
property, Landfall, ends up getting a higher tax base size than ten other municipalities
(which have with higher per capita real property) after the shared commercial and
industrial tax bases are assigned to them.
Empirical Estimation
The presence of two disincentive effects described above allows us to put forward
an empirical hypothesis that the program has negatively affected the size of commercial
and industrial properties in the municipalities located in the seven-county metro area due
to the effect of the areawide taxation resulting from the revenue side of the program and
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due to the effect of clawback on real property resulting from the expenditure side of the
program.24
The Sample
As explained above, the fiscal disparities program affects all taxing jurisdictions
in the Seven-County Twin Cities Metropolitan Area: counties, school districts, special tax
districts, cities and townships. We use a sample of cities as opposed to other types of
taxing jurisdictions because cities constitute the largest group of taxing jurisdictions for
which the necessary data are available.
The total number of cities included in the program varies according to different
sources. For example, according to the website of the Twin Cities’ Metropolitan Council
there are 2 central and 143 other cities in the area, i.e., 145 cities total.25 The data
provided by the Center for Small Towns26 include population for 138 cities, while a
report27 prepared by the House Research Department of the Minnesota House of
Representatives refers to 139 cities included in the program as of 2004.
Our sample of 110 cities that are affected by the program (i.e., cities that are
located inside the Seven-County Twin Cities Metropolitan Area) includes all cities inside
the metropolitan area for which the necessary data are available. Accordingly, these cities
are located in the seven counties that comprise the Seven-County Twin Cities
Metropolitan area: Anoka, Carver, Dakota, Hennepin, Ramsey, Scott, and Washington
(see Figure 7).

24

The latter effect should take place because commercial and industrial properties are included in
fiscal capacity as a part of real property.
25
http://www.metrocouncil.org/metroarea/FiscalDisparities/index.htm
26
http://www.morris.umn.edu/services/cst/index.htm
27
Minnesota’s Fiscal Disparities Programs, Twin Cities Metropolitan Area and Iron Range
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Figure 7: Fiscal Disparities Program Geographic Area:
Seven-County Twin Cities Metropolitan Area and Surrounding Counties

The sample of the cities that are not affected by the program is based on
geographical proximity of their location to the metropolitan area: to balance the sample
of the cities located inside the metropolitan area I select a sample of 110 cities located
outside its borders, but as close as possible to the metropolitan area (measured by driving
time to Minneapolis).28 These cities are located in 21 counties that surround the SevenCounty Twin Cities Metropolitan area (see Figure 4.6). Finally, the total number of cities
in our sample is 220 (i.e., 110 cities inside the metro area and 110 cities outside of the
metro area).

28

Out of three cities located in the longest driving time (93 minutes) I drop the one that is located
in the longest driving distance, leaving the total number of cities located outside the metro area in my
sample equal to 110.
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Cities from Wisconsin are not included in our sample of cities located outside the
metro area despite the fact that some of them are located closer to its borders than some
of the cities from Minnesota in our sample. For example, Hudson, WI is located just on
the border with Washington county that is included in the Twin Cities Metropolitan area,
and is only in 34 minutes of driving time from Minneapolis. I exclude the cities from
Wisconsin for two reasons: first, when we compare cities inside and outside the
metropolitan area it is preferable for them to be in the same state to keep as many things
equal as possible.
Empirical Model and Hypothesis
In our empirical model we use a dummy variable that shows whether a city is
located inside the seven-county metro area (metro dummy is equal to 1) or outside of it
(metro dummy is equal to 0). The estimation of the coefficient for the metro dummy is of
key importance for our analysis as it tells us whether the size of per capita commercial
and industrial property inside the metro area is lower than its size outside of the metro
area. As explained above, we expect it to be the case because the fiscal disparities
program implemented in the Twin Cities Metropolitan area creates two price effects that
discourage jurisdictions from allowing businesses to located inside their borders: first,
resulting from its revenue side (i.e., taxation of commercial and industrial property) and,
second, resulting from its expenditure side (i.e., distribution of commercial and industrial
property among municipalities in the inverse proportion to the size of their per capita real
property).
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Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for per capita commercial and industrial
property in cities in our sample distinguishing between cities located inside the sevencounty area and cities located outside of the area.
Table 5
Descriptive Statistics: per capita Commercial and Industrial Property
in the Cities in Our Sample

Max
Min

Outside Seven- Inside SevenTotal
County Area
County Area
30,350
52,047

52,047

173.1

1,092.4

173.1

6,928.0

10,995.7

8,961.9

Average (weighted)

10,177.6

14,952.8

13,982.6

Standard Deviation

5,175.8

9,431.1

7,858.7

0.51

0.63

0.56

Average (simple)

Coefficient of
Variation

Besides the metropolitan area dummy we should include in the model other
parameters that might affect the size of per capita commercial and industrial property. In
our choice of explanatory variables we partly rely on the previous literature that analyzes
the effect of local fiscal policies on business location using the data aggregated at the
localities’ level, Fox (1981), McHone (1986), McHone (1990), and we also add some
other explanatory variables.
The resulting empirical model is given by equation (4.21):

ln CI = α + β1 METRO + β 2 ln CI 1972 + β 3TIME + β 4 ln DEN +

β 5 ln TX + β 6 ln Y + β 7 PAF + β 8 LAP + β 9 ln RES + β10 ln POP
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(4.28)

where CI–market values of commercial and industrial property per capita in the
city in 2003,
METRO–dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the city is located inside the
metro area, and zero otherwise.
TIME–driving time in minutes from the city to the center of the metropolitan area
(i.e., Minneapolis),
CI1972–assessed valuation of commercial and industrial property per capita in the
city in 1972,
DEN–population density per square mile of land area in the city in 2000,
Y–median family income in the city in 2000 (in 1999 prices),
RES–residential property market values per capita in the city in 2003,
TX–the average tax rates for county, city, school and special districts within the
city in 2003,
PAF–police and fire protection expenditures per capita in the city in 2005,
LAP–library and park expenditures per capita in the city in 2005,
POP–population of the city, 2003.
Market values of commercial and industrial properties for year 2003, CI, are
expressed in per capita terms to take account of differences in city size. The population
data by which the commercial and industrial property are divided are from population
census 2000. We assume that the three year discrepancy should not create a problem in
this case.
The metro dummy, METRO, is of major importance in our analysis as it shows
whether the city is located inside of the metro area and, accordingly, is either affected by
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the fiscal disparities program or not. As those cities that are located inside the metro area
are facing price effects that discourage them from allowing businesses to locate inside
their borders, we expect that the sign of the estimate for the coefficient for this parameter
is negative.
Driving time from the city to the center of the metropolitan area,29 TIME, reflects
the attractiveness of the city for firms as a place of location. As the proximity of central
business district is a major attraction for commercial and industrial firms, the expected
effect of driving time to the center of the metropolitan area on commercial and industrial
property is negative. We use driving time instead of driving distance as driving time
better reflects location convenience.30
Including in our model per capita assessed valuation of commercial and industrial
property in the city in 1972, CI1972, allows us to control for the size of commercial and
industrial property before the fiscal disparities program was introduced. The expected
effect of this parameter on the size of per capita commercial and industrial property
values in 2003 is positive as it is likely that those cities that were attractive for businesses
in 1972 would keep their attractiveness in 2003 everything else being equal.
The population density of a city, DEN, is expected to be negatively related to its
willingness to accept commercial and industrial development because higher population
density means that there is less space for stores and factories in the city and that,
assuming that they mostly produce negative externalities, these might affect residents
more severely.

29

Accessed 1 June 2007, available from www.mapquest.com.
For example, of two cities that are located in 50 miles from the central business district, the one
accessible by a highway will be more attractive than the one, accessible by rural roads (assuming no traffic
jams on the highway, of course).
30
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Both median family income in the city, Y, and residential property per capita in
the city, RES, should negatively affect the size of commercial and industrial property in
the city because richer individuals who own more expensive houses are less willing to
accept commercial and industrial development in their neighborhoods, assuming again
that this development mostly produces negative externalities.
The tax price for commercial and industrial property development, TX, is
represented by average tax rates for county, school and special districts within the city,
and its effect on per capita commercial and industrial property is expected to be negative.
There are also two components of local budget expenditures that might affect
attractiveness of the city for commercial and industrial development: police and fire
protection expenditures and local expenditures for library and parks.
Police and fire protection expenditures per capita in the city, PAF, should
positively affect the size of commercial and industrial property values in the city as these
services benefit commercial and industrial firms located in its borders.
As suggested in the previous literature, 31 those local budget expenditures that
benefit local residents as opposed to local firms should negatively affect commercial and
industrial development in communities. Thus we would expect that per capita
expenditures for library and parks, LAP, will negatively affect the size of commercial and
industrial property values in the city.
Finally, the size of the city’s population, POP, should positively affect per capita
commercial and industrial development as a larger population might mean easier access
to labor market.

31

See for example McHone (1986)
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Results
The parameters of empirical model represented by (4.28) are estimated using
OLS. The results of the estimation are presented by (4.29):

ln CI = 13.7 − .38 METRO + .33 ln CI 1972 − .01 TIME − .15 ln DEN
( 2.28 )*

( 7.01)*

( 3.98 )*

( 2.55 )*

− .19 ln TX − .94 ln Y + .002 PAF + .001 LAP + .36 ln RES + .16 ln POP
(.79 )

( 2.81)*

( 2.68 )*

(.92 )

( 2.28 )*

(4.29)

( 4.10 )*

Adjusted R2 = .46, number of observations = 220.

The t-statistic for each variable’s coefficient is given in parentheses underneath it.
The statistical significance of the individual coefficients is indicated by an asterisk for a
5% significance level.
For the most of the control variables in our model, the signs and statistical
significance of the estimated coefficients match our expectations: the level of commercial
and industrial development in a city in 1972, police and fire expenditures from its budget
in 2005 as well as the population size positively affected the level of its commercial and
industrial development, while longer driving time to the center of the metropolitan area,
higher population density and higher median family income affected it negatively. All
these variables have coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5% level.
The expected negative effect on commercial and industrial development in a city
resulting from higher level of taxation and expenditures on libraries and parks is not
confirmed by our empirical estimation: despite having the expected negative sign, the
estimates of the appropriate coefficients for these variables in our model are not
statistically significant at a 5% level.
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For one control variable in our model, per capita size of residential property in a
city, the estimated coefficient has an unexpected sign and is also statistically significant
at the 5% level. According to this estimate, larger per capita residential property values in
a city are associated with a larger level of commercial and industrial development in its
borders.
The key result of our empirical analysis is that the coefficient for METRO is
negative and is statistically different from zero at the 5% significance level. This result is
consistent with our hypothesis that other things being equal in the cities located in the
Twin Cities Metropolitan area the per capita level of commercial and industrial
development is lower as the fiscal disparities program discourages municipalities from
accepting businesses inside their borders. Because the dependent variable enters the
equation (4.29) in the logarithm form, the coefficient at METRO variable measures the
semi-elasticity of per capita commercial and industrial property values with respect to
changes in metro dummy, i.e., when multiplied by 100 it tells us the number of
percentage points by which the explained variable will change when the explanatory
variable changes by one unit. Accordingly, the sign and the magnitude of the coefficient
tells us that the level of commercial and industrial development in a city as measured by
its per capita commercial and industrial property values is 38% lower inside the
metropolitan area than outside of it, other things being equal, which indicates rather large
economic significance of the variable. The estimate of the coefficient is quite robust as it
consistently stays in the range of 30-40% as we varied the specifications of the model and
changed the functional form of the control variables entering the equation.
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It is important to note that this result does not mean that per capita commercial
and industrial property values in the cities located inside of the seven-county area are
lower than in the cities located outside of the area. On contrary, the descriptive statistics
for our data in Table 4 shows that our sample of cities located in the seven-county Twin
Cities metro area has larger per capita commercial and industrial property values. In
terms of our model, on average for the cities located inside the tax base sharing area their
proximity to the central cities (inversely related to the driving time to Minneapolis)
outweighs the negative effect of the metro dummy. The fact that a city is affected by the
fiscal disparities program negatively affects its per capita commercial and industrial
property values, but it does not mean that this factor will always prevail.
When interpreting these findings we should take into account the possibility that
some other factors might have contributed to the lower level of commercial and industrial
development in the cities located in the seven-county Twin Cities area as compared with
the cities located in the surrounding counties. In his evaluation of the Twin Cities
metropolitan area tax base sharing, Reschovsky (1980) refers to Minnesota’s land
planning legislation and to a regional comprehensive plan instituted by Metropolitan
Council as to instruments intended to control or at least influence the location of business
activity in the area and argues that these changes in Minnesota development policies
made statistical analysis of the tax base sharing program extremely difficult.
My review of the Minnesota Land Planning Act (MLPA) and a number of cities’
comprehensive plans shows that there is no clear restriction on commercial and industrial
development implemented in this law. Basically, it requires jurisdictions within the
metropolitan area to develop comprehensive plans that show the planned pattern of
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development in their borders and to make sure that these plans are in agreement with the
current Regional Development Framework. This is a very general document, and it does
not specify any particular restrictions on growth. Its summary is presented in Appendix
IV.
Apparently, there is no reason for these policies to intervene with commercial and
industrial development in the Twin Cities metropolitan area. On contrary, if the first set
of the policies achieves its goals, the result should be an improvement in the area’s
economic (i.e., commercial and industrial) development in the metropolitan area.
Still, we should not disregard the possibility that some other region-specific
factors that we are not aware of have contributed to the lower level of commercial and
industrial property values in the seven-county area included in the fiscal disparities
program.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
Given the importance of equalization programs, which comprise a significant part
of subnational government revenues in many countries, the study of the unintended
consequences of equalization programs is important both for academic research and for
policy making. The major theme of this dissertation is to show that, even though
equalization is achieved by means of unconditional grants that are not supposed to
influence governments' policies and residents' behavior of the equalized jurisdictions,
equalization programs might produce substitution effects that result in changes in the
residents’ consumption of those goods that are related to the factors that are used as
measures of jurisdictions’ fiscal capacity, followed by appropriate changes in local
governments’ policies. Depending on the choice of the factors that are used to measure
jurisdictions’ ability to raise budget revenues, equalization programs could suppress
either revenue collections in the equalized jurisdictions or the size of their tax bases.
As a part of a general problem of disincentives created by equalization, we study
the case of Russia where regions distribute equalization grants among their constituent
municipalities based on their actual revenue collections. As different regions pursue
different degrees of equalization, the disincentives produced by their equalization
programs vary across regions, which allows us to test the hypothesis that a higher degree
of equalization, which our model predicts produces a stronger substitution effect, should
be associated with lower revenue collections in a region.
In this part of our work we develop a new approach that allows us to calculate
fiscal incentives faced by municipalities when the sharing rates of shared taxes assigned
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to them by regions vary from year to year. Using this approach we estimate fiscal
incentives faced by municipalities in 47 regions of Russia in a four-year time period of
1998-2001 at the first stage, and at the second stage we use those estimates to measure
the effect of fiscal incentives on the size of revenue collections in the regions.
The empirical evidence from the Russia’s case is consistent with the hypothesis
that equalization programs that are based on the actual revenue collections by equalized
jurisdictions might discourage them from collecting their own revenues when the degree
of equalization gets higher. The estimate of the coefficient that measures the effect of
fiscal incentives on tax effort is different from zero at a 5% significance level and has a
positive sign, which means that higher fiscal incentives (i.e., lower clawback or larger
matching effect of changes in regional transfers in response to changes in municipalities’
own revenues) result in a higher level of tax effort in the regions.
The magnitude of the effect that we can infer from the size of the coefficient is
not large. As fiscal incentives change by one unit, fiscal effort in a region would change
by 5.2%. The small effect of fiscal incentives faced by municipalities in Russia’s regions
is not surprising given that subnational governments in Russia lack any formal powers to
affect budget revenue collections. What is remarkable in these results is that despite the
lack of the formal powers, we still find a statistically significant effect of fiscal incentives
on tax effort in Russia’s regions, which implies that the fiscal incentives not only affect
Russia’s municipalities, but also induce them to change the economic environment inside
their borders.
This dissertation continues the study of the effects of equalization on the size of
tax bases in the equalized jurisdictions, which in the past have been only cursory
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addressed by Fischel (1975, 1976) and studied more deeply by Smart (1998). Both
Fischel (1975, 1976) and Smart (1998) argue that equalization should negatively affect
the size of tax bases located in the equalizing area, but there was no empirical evidence
provided to support this notion. This dissertation provides the first empirical evidence in
the literature related to this subject as we look at the empirical evidence from the Twin
Cities’ tax base sharing program.
Our empirical results show that for a sample of cities located inside the sevencounty Twin Cities metropolitan area and in the surrounding counties, when controlling
for other factors the fact that a city is included in the fiscal disparities program reduces its
size of per capita commercial and industrial properties by 38%. The magnitude of this
estimate not only indicates rather large economic significance of our findings for
evaluation of the effect of the Twin Cities metropolitan area fiscal disparities program on
economic development inside the area included in the tax base sharing program, but also
calls for further research related to equalization programs that are based on redistribution
of resources among jurisdictions based on the size of their tax bases.
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APPENDIX I
Table A1
Estimates of the Fiscal Incentives Coefficients (Clawbacks)
for Municipalities in Russia’s Regions
No
1
2
4
6
7
8
9
11
13
15
19
20
23
24
27
28
29
31
33
34
35
36
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

REGION
Bashkortostan republic
Buryatia republic
Kabardino-Balkaria
Karelia republic
Komi republic
Mari-El republic
Mordovia republic
Tatarstan republic
Udmurtia republic
Chuvashia republic
Krasnoyarskiy krai
Primorskiy krai
Amurskaya oblast
Arkhangelskaya oblast
Bryanskaya oblast
Vladimirskaya oblast
Volgogradskaya oblast
Voronezhskaya oblast
Ivanovskaya oblast
Irkutskaya oblast
Kaliningradskaya oblast
Tverskaya oblast
Kemerovskaya oblast
Kirovskaya oblast
Kostromskaya oblast
Samarskaya oblast
Kurganskaya oblast
Kurskaya oblast
Leningradskaya oblast

1998
-0.47
-0.69
-1.17
-0.80
-0.58
-0.17
-0.21
-0.33
-0.01
0.70
-0.79
0.65
-0.54
-0.58
-
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1999
-0.74
-0.87
0.39
0.12
-0.60
-0.01
-0.96
-0.31
-0.89
-0.58
0.28
-0.45
-0.12
-0.25
1.25
-0.78
-0.93

2000
-0.14
-0.63
0.25
-0.43
-0.78
0.11
0.00
-0.55
-0.15
0.34
-0.70
-0.77
-0.14
-0.91
0.16
0.41
-0.24
-1.06
-0.56

2001
-0.58
-0.33
-1.24
-0.17
0.87
0.78
-0.24
-1.26
0.31
1.13
0.02
0.22
-0.11
0.39
-0.15
-0.02
-0.23
-0.31

No
46
47
48
49
52
55
56
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
68
70
71
76
78
87
90

REGION
Lipetskaya oblast
Magadanskaya oblast
Moskovskaya oblast
Murmanskaya oblast
Omskaya oblast
Penzenskaya oblast
Permskaya oblast
Rostovskaya oblast
Ryazanskaya oblast
Saratovskaya oblast
Sakhalinskaya oblast
Sverdlovskaya oblast
Smolenskaya oblast
Tambovskaya oblast
Tomskaya oblast
Tulskaya oblast
Ulyanovskaya oblast
Chitinskaya oblast
Yaroslavskaya oblast
Adygeya republic
Yevreyskaya AO
Khanty-Mansiyskiy AO
Yamalo-Nenetskiy AO
Number of estimates for
the year:

1998
0.48
0.11
-0.22
-0.68
-0.39
-0.22
-0.65
-0.54
-0.91
-1.20
-0.84
0.58
-0.12
27
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1999
-1.01
-0.76
-0.77
0.42
-0.32
-0.17
-0.50
0.24
0.09
-0.14
-0.18
-0.64
-0.95
-1.02
-0.21
32

2000
0.11
-1.04
-0.14
-1.15
-0.03
-0.41
-0.76
-0.47
-0.36
-0.10
-0.01
-0.27
-0.23
-0.27
33

2001
-0.27
-0.46
0.01
-0.82
-0.88
-1.26
-0.04
0.01
-1.06
-1.30
0.14
0.09
-0.99
31

APPENDIX II
CALCULATING FISCAL CAPACITY OF RUSSIA’S REGIONS
In this dissertation when calculating tax effort of Russia’s regions we normalize
their revenues by fiscal capacity which is calculated by multiplying the regions’ gross
domestic product (i.e., gross regional product or GRP) by an adjustment coefficient that
takes into account the structure of value added and industrial output in each region and
the tax burden on different sectors of Russia’ economy and different sectors and subsectors of its industry.
GRP and the adjustment coefficients are taken from the Methodology and
distribution of federal transfers to the regions of Russian Federation as calculated by
Russia’s Ministry of finance for 2003 and 2004. The calculation of fiscal capacity of the
regions for 2003 and 2004 are based on the GRP, value added and industrial output data
for 1998-2000 and 1999-2001 accordingly. The regions’ fiscal capacity for these years is
calculated by averaging the data over a period of three years taken with a three-year lag.
The idea is that this approach should delay the changes in the size of the equalization
funds in response to changes in GRP of the regions and as a result reduce disincentives
imposed on the regions resulting from equalization.
For the purpose of this dissertation, we are interested in estimating the ability of
the regions to collect the tax revenues as precise as possible without any averaging or
delaying. Thus, when calculating tax effort for the regions in a particular year we use the
size of their revenues as well as GDP, value added and industrial output data for that
year.
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To calculate fiscal capacity for 1998 and 1999-2001 we use the data from the
Ministry of finance calculations for 2003 and 2004 accordingly. For a particular region
the fiscal capacity (i.e., adjusted GRP) for a particular year is calculated according to
formula (1):

GRP' = GRP ⋅ K

(1)

The adjustment coefficient K for each region takes into account 7 sectors of
Russia’s economy, 12 sectors of industry, and 17 sub-sectors of the industry’s sectors:
7

K = T1 D1 K1 + ∑ Ti Di

(2)

i =2

where Ti–the level of tax burden for sector i in Russia’s economy:

Ti =

Ri
VAi

(3)

where Ri - tax revenues collected to consolidated regional budgets in Russia in
sector i,
VAi–value added in sector i of Russia’s economy.
Di–share of value added in sector i in total value added in the economy of the
region:
Di =

VAi
∑VAi

(4)

VAi –value added in sector i of the economy of the region.

∑ VA - value added in all sectors of the economy of the region.
i

The first component of the equation, related to the tax payments levied on the
industrial output, is adjusted in its turn according to formula (5):
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5

12

K1 = ∑ T D K + ∑ Tk' Dk'
k =1

'
k

'
k

'
k

(5)

k =6

where Tk' is the level of tax burden on sector k of industry in the economy of
Russia:

Tk' =

Rk
Ik

(6)

where Rk–tax revenues collected in sector k of industry to consolidated regional
budgets in Russia,
Ik–output in sector k of Russia’s industry.

Dk' –share of output in sector k of region’s industry:
Dk' =

Ii

(7)

∑ Ii

where Ii–output in sector k of region’s industry.

∑I

k

– total industrial output in the region.

Five components of equation (5) are adjusted to take into account the differences
in the structure of the output of the appropriate sectors of industry according to formula
(8).
N

K k' = ∑ Tm'' Dm''

(8)

m =1

where Tm'' and Dm'' are calculated similarly to Tk' and Dk' above with the only
difference that revenues and industrial output are related not to sectors of industry, but to
sub-sectors of industry’s sectors.
The following list shows how those sectors of the economy, sectors and subsectors of industry are related when coefficient K is calculated.
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1. Industry
1) Fuel industry
i. Oil extracting industry
ii. Oil refining industry
iii. Gas extracting industry
iv. Coal industry
2) Food industry
i. Liquor and spirit industry
ii. Tobacco industry
iii. Fish industry
iv. Other sub-sectors of food industry
3) Chemical and petrochemical industry
i. Chemical industry
ii. Petrochemical industry
4) Logging, woodworking, pulp-and-paper industry
i. Logging industry
ii. Woodworking industry
iii. Pulp-and-paper industry
iv. Wood-chemical
5) Light industry
i. Textile industry
ii. Sewing industry
iii. Other sub-sectors of light industry
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6) Electric power industry
7) Ferrous metallurgy
8) Machine-building and metal cutting industry
9) Building materials industry
10) Microbiology industry
11) Medical industry
12) Other sectors of industry
2. Construction
3. Transport
4. Communication
5. Trade and services rendered to households
6. Housing and utilities
7. All other sectors of the economy
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APPENDIX III
Table B1
Growth of Metro Areawide Tax Base
Year

Total
Tax
Base
in
Areawide
Pool
(millions)

Total Metro
C/I
Tax
Base
(millions)

% of Total Total Metro
C/I
Tax Tax Base
Base
in
Areawide
Pool

% of Total
Tax Base in
Pool

(A)

(B)

(C)=(A)/(B)

(E)=(A)/(D)

(D)

1975

137

2044

6.7

6403

2.1

1980

328

2930

11.2

9363

3.5

1985

1264

5394

23.4

15710

8.0

1990

265

1019

26.0

2097

12.6

1991

`291

1052

27.7

2185

13.3

1992

293

1007

29.1

2103

13.9

1993

289

984

29.4

2039

14.2

1994

277

923

30.0

2004

13.8

1995

241

917

26.3

2065

11.7

1996

260

941

27.6

2184

11.9

1997

275

1015

27.1

2351

11.7

1998

264

941

28.1

2286

11.5

1999

253

917

27.6

2273

11.1

2000

278

980

28.4

2439

11.4

2001

314

1094

28.7

2745

11.4

2002

214

710

30.1

2130

10.0

2003

232

757

30.6

2337

9.9

2004
252
781
Source: House Research Department

32.3

2569

9.8
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APPENDIX IV
THE SUMMARY OF MINNESOTA LAND PLANNING ACT (MLPA)
1. Accommodating growth in a flexible, connected and efficient manner.
-

Supporting land-use patterns that efficiently connect housing, jobs, retail
centers and civic uses.

-

Encouraging growth and reinvestment in centers with convenient access to
transportation corridors.

-

Ensuring an adequate supply of developable land for future growth.

2. Slowing the growth in traffic congestion and improving mobility.
-

Improving the highway system, removing bottlenecks and adding
capacity.

-

Making more efficient use of the highway system by encouraging flexible
work hours, telecommuting, ridesharing and other traffic management
efforts.

-

Expanding the bus system and developing a network of new bus and/or
rail transit ways, based on a thorough cost-benefit analysis.

3. Encouraging expanded choices in housing locations and types.
-

Allowing market forces to respond to changing market needs, including
increased demand for town homes and condominiums as baby-boomers
grow older.

-

Preserving the existing housing stock to help maintain a full range of
housing choices.
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-

Supporting the production of lifecycle and affordable housing with better
links to jobs, services and amenities.

4. Working to conserve, protect and enhance the region's vital natural resources.
-

Encouraging the integration of natural-resource conservation into all landplanning decisions.

-

Seeking to protect important natural resources and adding areas to the
regional park system.

-

Working to protect the region’s water resources.
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